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Abstract
The first paper is “Handicapping Politicians: the optimal majority rule in incum-
bency elections.” The paper examines the incentives of politicians whose position
of incumbency allows them to signal their quality through costly effort. Because
an election has such a discrete outcome (to win or to lose), politicians will exert
the most effort when they expect the election to be close, giving rise to a clus-
ter of signals just above the threshold required to win. Two propositions follow:
first, this clustering causes a skew distribution of signals, such that the median
expected quality will be above the mean, so more candidates will be re-elected
than would be re-elected under full information, i.e. an incumbency advantage.
Second, because information is lost when politicians cluster, voters would prefer
to handicap the incumbents to make their signals more revealing. In practice this
can take the form of a supermajority rule for re-election.
The second paper, “Comparisons and Choice”, shows that many apparently
unrelated anomolies of choice can be explained as due to relative thinking. I con-
jecture that observing larger magnitudes of some goods tends to lower sensitivity
to that good. This predicts contrast effects, anchoring effects, scope neglect, and
common difference effects. We also introduce a technical novelty, evidence from
joint choice, allowing us to map out a utility function.
The third paper, “Relative Thinking and Markups,” applies the model of rela-
tive thinking to choice among retailers, when purchasing a single good. We show
that demand curves will tend to be less sensitive for higher price goods, so that in
the case of unit demand (where markups, price dispersion, and entry are normally
independent of cost) markups will be increasing in cost, price dispersion will be
increasing in cost, and entry will be increasing in cost. We show that evidence
from the IO literature, especially evidence on price dispersion, is consistent with
these predictions. We also introduce a novel dataset of costs and prices from a
drugstore in which there is a very tight positive relationship between cost and
markup.
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Handicapping Politicians: the optimal majority rule in
incumbency elections ∗
Francesco Caselli, Tom Cunningham, Massimo Morelli, and Ine´s Moreno de Barreda
June 2011
Abstract
We present a model of electoral competition between an incumbent and a chal-
lenger in which everything is symmetric except that voters receive more information
about the quality of the incumbent than that of the challenger. The information
is received with noise, and is subject to manipulation through costly effort by the
incumbent. In equilibrium we show that this model predicts an incumbency advan-
tage, such that incumbents are more likely to be elected than challengers even when
their qualities are drawn from identical symmetric distributions, and elected by vot-
ers with rational expectations. We also show that a supermajority re-election rule,
which sets a threshold for re-election somewhere greater than 50%, improves welfare,
mainly through discouraging low-quality politicians from sending high signals.
1 Introduction
In developing countries sitting politicians often are able to exercise considerable influ-
ence over the electoral process, and so engineer re-election. This power may explain
observations of high re-election rates and voters’ desire for term limits. However in
developed countries powerful causal incumbency advantages seem to be present in
offices which have little direct control over the electoral process, and where there is
∗This chapter draws on a joint work with Francesco Caselli, Ine´s Moreno de Barreda and Massimo
Morelli. The idea of the paper was motivated by Francesco Caselli and Massimo Morelli willingness to
provide a normative solution to deal with the well-documented problem of casual incumbency advantage.
Ine´s Moreno de Barreda and myself carried out all the analytical results and writing of this paper with
equal share; general decisions about the direction of the paper were made equally between the four authors.
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no seniority rationale for re-election (Ansolabehere and Snyder; 2002). The principal
asymmetry between incumbent and challengers seems to be just in information: that
voters are much more informed about incumbents. Cain et al. (1987) state this as
follows:
Incumbents win because they are better known and more favorably evaluated by any
wide variety of measures. And they are better known and more favorably evaluated
because, among other factors, they bombard constituents with missives containing a
predominance of favorable material, maintain extensive district office operations to
service their constituencies, use modern technology to target groups of constituents
with particular policy interests, and vastly outspend their opponents.1
This observation is difficult to reconcile with rational expectations, where
extra information about the incumbent should not systematically bias voters’
beliefs.
We show in this paper that even under rational expectations incumbent
power over information can lead to a systematic bias in election, such that
incumbents are re-elected with a significantly higher probability than in the
case without the ability to manipulate the signal. Roughly, the reason is that
medium-quality politicians exert a lot of effort to send signals similar to those
sent by high-quality politicians, thus generating a skew distribution of signals.
The median signal is above the mean signal, meaning that more than 50 percent
of signals lead to posterior expected quality that is greater than the average
quality, so more than 50 percent of politicians will be re-elected.
More interestingly we show that voters can improve the efficiency of the
electoral system by handicapping the incumbent, that is by raising the threshold
on expected quality needed to win re-election. A handicap will weaken the
incentive of low-quality incumbents to exert effort, while strengthening the
incentive of medium and high-quality incumbents to exert effort. The net effect
is to raise the average quality of elected politicians.
The handicap we suggest is not time consistent, i.e. voters do not want
to enforce it ex post. We thus suggest a simple constitutional mechanism for
implementation: a supermajority rule, where incumbent politicians require a
share of the vote strictly greater than one half in order to win re-election.
In the remainder of this Introduction we discuss related empirical and theo-
1See Cain et al. (1987) p10.
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retical literature. Section sets up the model, and characterizes the equilibrium.
For the rest of the paper we consider a simple symmetric 3-types distribution of
politician types. Section analyzes the case of the simple majority rule. Section
shows that under the simple majority rule an incumbency advantage exists in
equilibrium. Section shows that the optimal re-election rule is a supermajor-
ity rule. Section gives an illustrative calibration, and Section discusses related
issues and implementation of the supermajority rule.
1.1 Empirical Literature
The observed incumbency advantage is usually thought of as composed of a
selection effect and a causal effect. The selection effect is due to incumbents
being typically higher quality than challengers, and may be largely benign.
A causal effect of incumbency could arise for a number of reasons, good and
bad. For example, experience in office may improve the ability of a politician,
or make them more effective through earning seniority. On the other hand,
the privileges of office may allow them to unfairly influence the next election.
The causal and selection effects are difficult to separate, though there are some
notable recent attempts.
Levitt and Wolfram (1997) compare repeated pairings of candidates for elec-
tion to the US Congress, in an attempt to control for the quality of incumbent
and challenger. They find that the winner of the previous race has on average
a 4% higher vote share in the second pairing.
Ansolabehere et al. (2000) compare county-level vote shares after redistrict-
ing in US Congressional elections. They find that incumbents receive 4% fewer
votes in counties which have been redistricted into their constituencies, than in
counties which remained in their constituency for both elections.
Lee (2008) compares bare winners and bare losers of elections. He finds that
a party which barely wins a Congressional election has on average an 8% higher
vote share and a 35% higher probability of winning the next election.2
Supermajority rules (also called “special majority”) are common in consti-
tutions, for example the US Congress can bypass the US President’s veto only
with a two thirds majority (Goodin and List; 2006).3 More recently, the Turk-
2Note that Lee estimates the incumbency advantage that accrues to the party, not the candidate.
3Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) show that under certain conditions, a 64% supermajority voting rule can
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ish ruling party narrowly missed the supermajority threshold of two thirds of
the seats that would have allowed them to change the Constitution unilaterally.
However we are not aware of any supermajority rule being used to handicap
the election of incumbents in the way that we suggest.
Finally note that although we know of no explicit incumbent supermajor-
ity rules, a similar effect is produced by existing institutions. Constitutional
term limits can generally be overturned by an amendment, and constitutional
amendments often require a supermajority among legislators. The net effect
is then something similar to a supermajority rule on re-election. This is not
uncommon in states with term limits, see for example in Colombia in 2004 and
in Algeria in 2008.
1.2 Theoretical Literature
The theoretical literature discusses three mechanisms related to incumbency
that are relevant to our model. The three mechanisms are (i) that re-election
can function as a reward for good behavior, (ii) that extra information about
incumbents allows signaling, and (iii) that there can be complementarities be-
tween politicians’ terms.
An early literature on re-election incentives proposes that voters motivate
politician effort by using re-election as a reward for good behavior (e.g. Barro
(1973)). In this kind of model a term limit would have an unambiguously nega-
tive effect on welfare because it would disable one of the principal mechanisms
by which politicians are motivated.
A problem with models of this type is that the threat of punishment is only
barely credible. When politicians all have the same quality voters are always
indifferent between the incumbent and the challenger. This indifference means
that an equilibrium in which voters punish badly behaved politicians can be
subgame perfect.4 However this indifference also means that if there exists any
heterogeneity in politician talent, then the equilibrium disappears. For forward-
looking voters any difference in perceived talent will dominate incentives to
punish or reward sitting politicians. Voters may in fact be partly backward
looking (see Smith et al. (1994)), which would of course complicate incentives
eliminate intransitivities in aggregation of preferences.
4Along with many other equilibria.
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for incumbents. We abstract away from these considerations in this paper.
A second strategic aspect of incumbency exists when politicians differ in
ability, and voters observe signals related to ability when a politician is in
power.5 Early papers in this literature include ?, in which signaling produces
a political budget cycle.
Smart and Sturm (2006) use this type of model, a signaling model, to analyze
term limits. Their model has two types of politicians and information about
the economy which is private to the politician. Re-election incentives cause
both types to ignore their private information, for fear of being perceived as a
low type. A term limit, which removes re-election incentives, can eliminate the
distortion in policy choice and so raise welfare. Under certain parameters their
model also predicts that a two-period term limit is superior to a one-period
limit, because there will be some sorting of politicians in the first term.
Our model extends this signaling literature, and shows that it has a natural
prediction for a rule on vote shares.
Finally, Gerbach (2008, 2009), like us propose a supermajority rule. In
Gerbach (2008), the politician’s type is fully revealed to voters once they are
elected. However low quality incumbents are sometimes re-elected because
while in power they implement policies with benefits that are contingent on
re-election, thus generating complementarities between terms in office. A su-
permajority rule can deter such hostage-taking policies. In an independent
work, Gerbach (2009) proposes a model in which incumbents signal their abil-
ity with costly effort, with similar predictions to ours. Their different model
however displays a continuum of pooling and semi-separating equilibria, and
hence welfare judgments are derived under assumptions about the likelihood
distribution over equilibria. Our modeling assumptions allow us to avoid such
equilibrium selection problems.
2 The Model
The game is between two politicians - incumbent and challenger - and a con-
tinuum of voters. Both incumbent and challenger are defined by their talent
θ ∈ Θ. Talent may be understood as the quality of the politician, a character-
5This can be seen as a reinterpretation of the intuition in Barro (1973).
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istic orthogonal to the political space, valued by every voter in the same way6.
A few examples of what might be called talent are competency, honesty and
charisma. The talents of both politicians are drawn from the same distribution
with cumulative distribution function F (·) and mean θˆ.
The asymmetry between incumbent and challenger comes from the fact that
during his period in office the incumbent can send a message about his talent
to voters. More importantly, the incumbent can boost his message by exerting
some costly effort. The message, denoted by θ˜, is an additive combination of
the politician’s talent and his effort, θ˜ = θ+ e. The cost of effort is denoted by
c(·) and is incurred only by the incumbent.7
Voters receive the message with some noise, representing the many unob-
servables which contribute to political outcomes, and constrain voters’ ability
to infer a politician’s quality. Both the incumbency advantage and the su-
permajority result can be derived without noise, but noise eliminates pooling
equilibria and hence allows us to explore the comparative statics of the equilib-
ria. Also, noise generates a realistically continuous distribution of vote shares,
which we use in our calibration.
To differentiate between the information sent by the incumbent and the
information received by voters, we will call message what the incumbent sends
and signal what the voters receive. The signal is equal to the original message,
plus noise s = θ˜ + , where  is drawn from a continuous distribution with
mean zero, symmetric and single peaked density distribution function g(·) and
cumulative distribution function G(·).
Note that all voters receive the same signal, i.e. the noise is common to
all voters.8 However, voters differ in their preferences for the incumbent. We
assume that the utility of voter i given an incumbent with talent θ is given by:
ui(θ) = θ + ηi (1)
where ηi represents voter i’s relative preference for the incumbent over the
6This concept is also called in the literature quality or valence (Ansolabehere and Snyder; 2000; Carrillo
and Castanheira; 2002; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita; 2008a,b).
7One might also think of the politician signaling their talent through the choice of a public policy as
in Smart and Sturm (2006). We have abstracted of this because we wanted to isolate the informational
effect of signalling and its indirect welfare implications.
8We discuss in footnote 16 the general effects of heterogenous information.
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challenger. We assume that ηi is continuously distributed, with full support on
the real line, with cumulative distribution function H(·), density distribution
h(·) with both mean and median equal to 0.
This model can be seen as a reduced form of a model in which, after the
incumbent sends his message to the population, both incumbent and challenger
announce their political platforms. In any subgame perfect equilibrium of such
a model, there would be convergence of platforms to the median voter’s pref-
erences, and hence the choice of effort is taken as if the voters had preferences
given by (1).9 Finally, we assume that voters support the incumbent when
indifferent, though because the noise distribution is atomless, the probability
of an indifference occurring is vanishingly small.
Politicians are only office-motivated. Being in office leads to a reward of pi.
Their only cost is the cost of effort. Thus the incumbent chooses the level of
effort to maximize
V (θ, e) = piPr(reelection|θ, e)− c(e)
The game has two decision stages. In the first stage the incumbent sends a
message that the voters receive with some noise. In the second stage the voters
cast their vote. The outcome of the election depends on the votes cast and
the re-election rule. We will denote a re-election rule by q when the incumbent
needs at least the fraction q of the votes in order to be re-elected. In Section 3
we consider the particular case of simple majority rule for which q = 1
2
.
Given voters’ preferences a simple majority rule is equivalent to giving all
power to the median voter, which is in turn equivalent to maximizing a util-
itarian social welfare function. On the other hand, as we will discuss later in
Section 5, a supermajority rule is equivalent to giving all the power to a voter
who is opposed to or dislikes the incumbent. In order to be re-elected the in-
cumbent’s talent should be high enough to gain the support from this hostile
voter.
9There is a recent literature that focuses on the interaction between the choice of effort and the choice
of platform (see Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000); Aragones and Palfrey (2002); Carrillo and Castanheira
(2002); Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2008a); Meirowitz (2008)) when there is no asymmetry between
the candidates. In some of these papers there is divergence of platforms in equilibrium. We abstract from
the possibility of divergence and we choose instead to work with a model that corresponds to the more
standard convergence outcome because the focus is not on the interaction between valence and political
competition.
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Given a re-election rule q, an equilibrium is defined by an effort rule, eq :
Θ→ [0,+∞) for the incumbent, and a voting rule, vq : R×R→ {0, 1} for the
voters such that:
(i) eq(θ) ∈ argmaxe piPr(reelection|vq(·), θ + e, q)− c(e)
(ii) vq(s, ηi) = 1 if and only if E[θ|s, eq(·)] + ηi ≥ θˆ
(2)
where Pr(reelection|vq(·), θ + e, q) is the probability of re-election given the
voting rule vq(·), the message θ˜ = θ + e and the re-election rule q:
Pr(reelection|vq(·), θ + e, q) = Pr
(∫
vq(θ + e+ , ηi)dH(ηi) ≥ q
)
and where E[θ|s, eq(·)] is the expected talent of the incumbent given that the
public signal is s and using a posterior distribution of the incumbent’s talent
consistent with the equilibrium effort eq(·).
Finally, we will say that the noise distribution g(·) satisfies the Monotone
Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) if whenever θ˜1 > θ˜2, then
g(s−θ˜1)
g(s−θ˜2) increases in
s.10 The MLRP implies that higher signals lead to higher posterior distributions
of the talent (higher here meaning first-order stochastic dominance).
The following proposition states than in equilibrium, the incumbent is re-
elected whenever the public signal is equal to or above a certain threshold, and
is not re-elected otherwise.
Proposition 1 For any re-election rule q, if the cost of effort, c(·) is strictly
convex and the distribution of noise satisfies the MLRP, then in any equilibrium
e∗q(·) and v∗q (·), the incumbent is re-elected if and only if the public signal is above
a threshold kq, where kq is given by:
E[θ|s = kq, e∗q(·)] = θˆ −H−1(1− q) (3)
Equation (3) states that the expected quality of an incumbent who sends
a signal s = kq should equal the expected quality of a challenger, minus the
partisan preference of the qth percentile voter towards the incumbent.
The proof of Proposition 1 is similar to that of Theorem 1 in Matthews and
10This definition corresponds to the special case of the MLRP defined by Milgrom (1981) when the signal
structure is additive.
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Mirman (1983) regarding limit pricing. Their setup is close to ours: a monopoly
wants to deter the entrant of a possible challenger, and they do so by lowering
their price, to signal lower profitability in the market. Analogously, a politician
exerts effort to signal their type.
We begin with two preliminary results. In Lemma 1 we show that if the
cost function is convex, the message sent by the incumbent is nondecreasing in
his type.
Lemma 1 Given a re-election rule q, if c(·) is strictly convex, and eq(·) is a
best response to vq(·), then the corresponding message θ˜q(·) is nondecreasing in
θ.
Proof Let θ1 < θ2, and denote θ˜q(θi) by θ˜i and Pr(reelection|vq(·), θ˜i, q) by
P (θ˜i). Since eq(·) (and therefore θ˜q(·)) is a best response to vq(·),
piP (θ˜1)− c(θ˜1 − θ1) ≥ piP (θ˜2)− c(θ˜2 − θ1)
piP (θ˜2)− c(θ˜2 − θ2) ≥ piP (θ˜1)− c(θ˜1 − θ2)
Rearranging:
c(θ˜2 − θ1)− c(θ˜1 − θ1) ≥ pi(P (θ˜2)− P (θ˜1)) ≥ c(θ˜2 − θ2)− c(θ˜1 − θ2)
Since the distance between the two sets of points is the same: |(θ˜2 − θ1) −
(θ˜1 − θ1)| = |(θ˜2 − θ2)− (θ˜1 − θ2)|, the convexity of c(·) implies that θ˜1 ≤ θ˜2.
In Lemma 2 we find sufficient conditions so that each voter’s best response
is a threshold rule.
Lemma 2 If θ˜(·) is increasing and g(·) satisfies the MLRP, then voter i’s best
response is a threshold rule:
v(s, ηi) =
{
0 if s < ki
1 if s ≥ ki
where ki is determined by E[θ|s = ki, eq(·)] + ηi = θˆ. Moreover, ki is decreasing
in the preference parameter ηi.
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Proof If θ˜(·) is increasing in θ and g(·) satisfies the MLRP, the conditional
expectation of the talent is increasing in the signal received by the voter (Mil-
grom; 1981), i.e., if s1<s2 then E[θ|s1, eq(·)] < E[θ|s2, eq(·)].
Moreover, since no information is revealed from the challenger, the expected
talent of the challenger coincides with the mean of the talent distribution.
Therefore, a voter with partisan position ηi supports the incumbent if and
only if:
E[θ|s, eq(·)] + ηi ≥ θˆ (4)
Since the conditional expectation is increasing and continuous, there is a unique
solution ki to the equation E[θ|s = ki, eq(·)] + ηi = θˆ and voter i follows a
threshold rule in which v(s, ηi) = 1 if and only if s ≥ ki. Finally, by the
monotonicity of the expectation, ki is decreasing in ηi. 
Now we prove Proposition 1.
Proof (Proposition 1) For any equilibrium e∗q(·) and v∗q (·), if c(·) is convex,
Lemma 1 implies that θ˜∗q(·) is nondecreasing in theta. By the MLRP this implies
that E[θ|s, eq(·)] is nondecreasing in s, and therefore v∗q (·, ηi) is nondecreasing
in s. If v∗q (·) is constant, then e∗q(·) ≡ 0 since the effort is costly and does not
change the behavior of voters. But then θ˜∗(θ) = θ is increasing in θ and Lemma
2 implies that v∗q (·) is not constant. Therefore v∗q (·, ηi) must be a threshold
rule with some threshold ki,q. By the monotonicity of the expectation, ki,q is
decreasing in ηi. Denote by φq(·) the decreasing function such that φq(ηi) = ki,q.
The set of voters that support the incumbent given a signal s is Ss = {i : ηi ≥
ηs} where ηs = φ−1q (s). Define ηq = H−1(1 − q) and kq = φq(ηq). The signal
s = kq is the minimal signal that guarantees reelection under rule q. In effect
if s ≥ kq then the share of votes for the incumbent is: Pr(ηi ≥ ηs) ≥ Pr(ηi ≥
ηq) = 1−H(ηq) = q. 
Given a threshold kq, the probability of re-election for an incumbent that
sends message θ˜ is Pr(θ˜ +  ≥ kq) = 1−G(kq − θ˜) = G(θ˜ − kq), where the last
equality comes by the symmetry of the noise distribution.
We can now write the expected payoff of the incumbent as:
V (θ, e, q) = piG(θ + e− kq)− c(e)
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then the (local) first and second order conditions for the optimal effort level,
e∗q(·) are:
pig(θ + e∗q(θ)− kq) = c′(e∗q(θ))
pig′(θ + e∗q(θ)− kq)− c′′(e∗q(θ)) < 0
(5)
To guarantee that the local first and second order condition are sufficient
for a global optimum we assume throughout the paper the following condition:
inf
e
c′′(e) > pi sup

g′() (6)
Condition (6) requires the cost function to be sufficiently convex, so that the
marginal cost cuts only once the marginal benefit.
Equation (5) together with the definition of the threshold (3), determine the
equilibrium.
Up to now we have not made any assumption on the set Θ and the cumu-
lative distribution of the talent F (·). For the rest of the paper we assume that
the distribution of the politician talents is symmetric and has three types, i.e.
Θ = {θL, θM , θH}, with θH − θM = θM − θL ≡ δ and p = Pr(θM) = Pr(θL).
The symmetry assumption is here because, following the argument of Cain
et al. (1987), we want to isolate the effect of the manipulation of the messages on
the incumbency advantage. If the distribution of talent was skewed, for example
if the median talent was above the mean, we would expect an incumbency
advantage even without the manipulation of the messages. To see this, suppose
that the voters could perfectly learn a politician’s talent once he is in power.
Then in more than 50% of elections the voters will discover that the incumbent
has greater talent than the expected talent of the challenger, and hence they
will strictly prefer to keep that politician. So more than 50% of the candidates
will be re-elected. In a symmetric distribution, no incumbency advantage can
arise without manipulation of the messages.
We consider three types because it is the simplest model that is rich enough
to be able to explain all the mechanism we want to highlight. Simulations
with continuous distributions make us believe that the results are true more
generally, but we leave derivations for future work.
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3 Simple Majority Rule
As a benchmark consider the simple majority rule q = 1
2
. Notice that given
the assumptions on the voters’ preferences for the incumbent, equation (3)
becomes:11
E[θ|s = k∗] = θˆ (7)
where k∗ denotes the equilibrium threshold in the simple majority case. In
other words, the simple majority rule is equivalent to giving all the power to the
median voter, the voter that is ex-ante (before receiving the signal) indifferent
between the incumbent and the challenger. The incumbent will be re-elected if
and only if this voter believes him to have a higher than average talent.
The equilibrium for the simple majority rule has the following properties:
Proposition 2 With a simple majority rule, the equilibrium is unique. The
effort levels satisfy eM > eL = eH ≡ e∗ with e∗ = c′−1(pig(θH − θM)) and the
threshold signal is given by k∗ = θM + e∗.
Proof For clarity we omit the reference to the electoral rule on the equilib-
rium variables. Given the talent distribution, upon receiving a signal s = k∗,
equation (7) becomes: ∑
j θjg(k
∗ − θ˜j)Pr(θj)∑
j g(k
∗ − θ˜j)Pr(θj)
= θM
and given Pr(θH) = Pr(θL) and θH − θM = θH − θM , it simplifies to:
g(k∗ − θ˜H) = g(k∗ − θ˜L) (8)
In particular, given the symmetry of the noise distribution, equation (8) implies
that the equilibrium threshold will be exactly half-way between the signals sent
by the high and low types incumbents:
k∗ =
θ˜H + θ˜L
2
= θM +
eH + eL
2
(9)
On the other hand, the first order conditions for the equilibrium effort (5)
11For clarity we suppress reference to the effort function e∗1/2(·).
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together with equation (8) imply that eH = eL. Denote by e
∗ this effort level.
Then (9) implies k∗ = θM + e∗.
To see that eM > e
∗ notice that, from the single-peakedness and symmetry
of g:
pig(k∗ − θM − e∗) > pig(k∗ − θL − e∗) = c′(e∗)
that is, the marginal benefit for an incumbent with type θM of exerting effort e
∗
outweighs the marginal cost of exerting this level of effort. Therefore, eM > e
∗.
Finally, replacing k∗ = θM + e∗ into the first order conditions for e∗ given
by equation (5), we obtain the equilibrium level e∗:
c′(e∗) = pig(δ)
where δ ≡ θH − θM = θM − θL represents the dispersion of the talent distribu-
tion12. 
The equilibrium can be visualized in Figure 1. Both the talents and the
messages can be read on the horizontal axis. The upward sloping lines represent
the marginal costs of effort for each type. Equilibrium messages are determined
by their intersections with the curve which represents the marginal benefit of
exerting effort, pig(θ˜ − k∗). The curve’s peak is at k∗ = θM + e∗, the threshold
above which incumbents are re-elected.
The effort level e∗ is increasing in pi, decreasing in the marginal cost, and
decreasing in the dispersion of the incumbent’s talent δ. These results are very
intuitive, a direct change in the marginal benefit or cost changes the effort level
accordingly. Moreover, if the distance between incumbents increases then it is
more difficult to fool the voters by exerting effort and therefore the marginal
benefits of effort goes down and they exert less effort.
Assuming that the noise is normally distributed with variance σ2 and mean
zero, we can further study how the equilibrium effort level changes with the
variance of the noise. The change in the equilibrium effort with respect to the
variance of the noise depends on the relative size of the variance of the noise
12The distance between the talents of the incumbents is a measure of the dispersion of the distribution.
In fact the variance of the talents is given by: V ar(θ) = 2p(θH − θM )2 = 2pδ2
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pig(θ˜ − k∗)
θL θM θH
c′(eL) c′(eM)
c′(eH)
︷ ︸︸ ︷e∗
θ˜L
︷ ︸︸ ︷e∗
θ˜H
︷ ︸︸ ︷eM
θ˜M
k∗ = θM + e∗
Fig. 1: Equilibrium
and the square of the dispersion of the incumbents:
∂e∗/∂σ2 < 0 if and only if σ
2
 > δ
2 (10)
To understand this result consider the following two extreme scenarios. Suppose
that the signal is extremely noisy, then voters do not infer much from the signal
and incumbents exert very little effort. If the variance of the signal decreases
making the signal more informative, then re-election will be more responsive to
the signal received and incumbents will exert more effort. On the other hand,
if the signal is very precise, incumbents are not going to be able to fool the
voters and exert little effort. Condition (10) says that whether we consider the
signal extremely noisy or very precise depends on the relative variances of the
two distributions.
4 Incumbency Advantage
One interesting feature of the equilibrium is that the incumbents with middle
talent are the ones that exert higher effort. The reason is that the equilibrium
threshold is closer to their types and hence they have greater incentive to exert
effort.
22
This extra effort from the incumbents with middle talent implies that the
distribution of the messages, signals, and ultimately of expected types, will
be negatively skewed (median is above the mean) leading to our result of an
incumbency advantage.
We say that there is an incumbency advantage if the expected probability
of being re-elected for an incumbent is greater than 50%.
Proposition 3 The electoral competition model with the simple majority rule
exhibits an incumbency advantage.
Proof From Proposition 2, eM > e
∗. The probability of re-election for an
incumbent with talent θj that sends message θ˜j is then:
Pr(reelection | θ˜j) = Pr(θ˜j +  > k∗) = 1−G(k∗ − θj − ej)
The unconditional probability of re-election is therefore:
Pr(s ≥ k∗) = p(1−G(k∗ − θ˜H)) + p(1−G(k∗ − θ˜L)) + (1− 2p)(1−G(k∗ − θ˜M))
= p+ (1− 2p)(1−G(k∗ − θ˜M))
> 1
2
(11)
Where the second equality follows because G(k∗ − θ˜H) = 1 − G(k∗ − θ˜L) and
the inequality because eM > e
∗ so θ˜M > k∗. 
Intuitively, when the median voter chooses whether to reappoint the incum-
bent or not, she compares her updated belief about the talent of the incumbent
with the average talent of the challenger. In doing so, she can ignore middle
type incumbents because they have just average talent, and hence taking into
account the equilibrium messages of the incumbents, the threshold signal would
be just the middle point between the messages sent by the low and the high
signals. But given that the incumbents with middle talent exert more effort
than the others, the message θ˜M will exceed the threshold and therefore they
will be re-elected more than half of the times. Because the average re-election
probability for low and high types, when combined, is equal to exactly 50%,
the total expected re-election probability will be greater than 50%.
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5 Supermajority
In this section we consider the social planner’s problem of maximizing the total
welfare of the voters by choosing a re-election rule (we ignore the utility of
the incumbent when computing the social welfare). We prove that the simple
majority rule is suboptimal and that the welfare maximizing rule must be a
supermajority rule (q > 1
2
).
We proceed in two steps. First, for the simple majority rule equilibrium
we show that the voters would be better off if they could commit to a higher
threshold to re-elect the incumbent. This commitment is not credible because
ex post it is efficient to re-elect the incumbent if the updated beliefs indicate
that he is above average (i.e., if the median voter would prefer him). We then
propose a way to implement this commitment by setting a supermajority rule
that takes decision power from the median voter and gives it to a voter with a
partisan position somewhat against the incumbent.
Proposition 4 In the electoral competition model with the simple majority
rule, the welfare maximizing threshold is above the equilibrium threshold k∗.
Proof Given a threshold k, the expected welfare can be expressed as the
value of the outside option (the expected value of a challenger, θM), plus the
expected change in value from retaining the incumbent:13
EW = θM + pPr(θ˜H +  ≥ k)(θH − θM) + pPr(θ˜L +  ≥ k)(θL − θM)
= θM + pδ(G(θ˜H − k)−G(θ˜L − k))
(12)
The optimal threshold is then determined by the first order condition:
∂EW
∂k
= pδ
(
g(θ˜H − k)(∂eH
∂k
− 1)− g(θ˜L − k)(∂eL
∂k
− 1)
)
= 0 (13)
At the equilibrium threshold, g(θ˜H − k∗) = g(θ˜L − k∗), therefore if we evaluate
the derivative (13) at k∗, the direct effect on welfare of a change in the threshold
is zero. However, the change in the threshold also affects the choice of effort.
Recall that the optimal level of effort given a threshold k satisfies the following
13The partisan preferences (ηi) disappear from this expression, because of their zero mean.
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first and second order conditions:
pig(θj + ej − k) = c′(ej)
pig′(θj + ej − k)− c′′(ej) < 0
(14)
In particular, totally differentiating the first order condition with respect to k
and rearranging:
∂ej
∂k
=
pig′(θj + ej − k)
pig′(θj + ej − k)− c′′(ej) (15)
and using the second order condition and the fact that g′(θL + eL − k∗) > 0 >
g′(θH + eH − k∗) we have that:
∂eH
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k=k∗
> 0 and
∂eL
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k=k∗
< 0
Hence, plugging this into (13), the indirect effect on welfare of a raise in the
threshold is positive. Increasing the threshold causes θH to exert more effort
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while θL will reduce his effort, leading to more separation between the incum-
bents’ signals and as a result an increase in welfare.
We have shown that welfare is improved by marginally increasing the thresh-
old from its Nash equilibrium level. However this is not sufficient to show that
a threshold higher than the Nash equilibrium threshold is optimal, because
the welfare function may not be single-peaked. We therefore demonstrate be-
low that for any threshold k < k∗ the correspondent welfare is strictly lower
than the welfare at the equilibrium threshold k∗. To see that, first notice that
given θj, the optimal effort level ej defined by equation (14) is a single-peaked
function of the threshold k. For a given θj, the effort ej(·) is increasing for
k < θj + c
′−1(pig(0)) and decreasing otherwise. Moreover, given equation (14),
we have the following identity:
eL(k − (θH − θL)) ≡ eH(k)
so the optimal effort function of the low type is a horizontal shift to the left of
the effort of the high type (see Figure 2).
At the equilibrium threshold, eL(k
∗) = eH(k∗) ≡ e∗ so eL(k∗) = eL(k∗ −
14A marginally higher threshold also leads the middle θM to exert more effort. To see this observe that
θM + eM − k∗ = eM − e∗ > 0 and hence g′(θM + eM − k∗) < 0 and ∂eM∂k |k=k∗ > 0.
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-eL(·) eH(·)
k∗ k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
θH − θL
Fig. 2: Effort functions
(θH − θL)) which implies that k∗ is on the downward-sloping part of curve
eL(·) and on the upward-sloping part of eH(·). A representation of the effort
functions can be seen in Figure 2.
Consider k < k∗, then eL(k) > eH(k) and hence the distance between the
high and low messages under threshold k is smaller than under threshold k∗:
θ˜H(k)− θ˜L(k) < θ˜∗H − θ˜∗L (16)
Notice that by the symmetry of the noise distribution, the following two re-
marks are satisfied:
R1: Whenever two points are at a fixed distance h, G(x)−G(x−h) is max-
imized at x = h
2
, that is, when the two points are equidistant to the mean.15
R2: Given two points equidistant to the mean, the difference in the cumu-
lative distribution is increasing in the distance between the two points:
∂
∂h
[
G(
h
2
)−G(−h
2
)
]
=
1
2
(g(
h
2
) + g(−h
2
)) > 0
We can now conclude that for any threshold k < k∗ the welfare under
15To see this consider the first order condition with respect to x: g(x) − g(x − h) = 0, and by the
symmetry of g(·), this implies x = −(x− h) or x = h2 .
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threshold k is lower than under the equilibrium threshold k∗:
EW (k) = θM + pδ(G(θ˜H(k)− k)−G(θ˜L(k)− k))
≤ θM + pδ(G( θ˜H(k)−θ˜L(k)2 )−G(− θ˜H(k)−θ˜L(k)2 ))
≤ θM + pδ(G( θ˜
∗
H−θ˜∗L
2
)−G(− θ˜∗H−θ˜∗L
2
))
= EW (k∗)
where the first inequality follows from R1 and the second from R2 and (16).
Proposition 4 implies that the voters would be better off if they could commit
to re-elect incumbents that have expected talent above a level which is strictly
higher than the ex-ante average talent. An increase in the threshold will cause
high types to exert more effort and low types to exert less effort. For both
types their efforts will not offset the increase in the threshold, so both will be
re-elected with a lower probability. But it is the larger fall in the probability of
low-type re-election that increases welfare. In other words a supermajority rule
makes voters better off entirely through discouraging low quality politicians
from seeking re-election.
This higher threshold is not optimal ex post, because it asks the voters
not to re-elect some politicians with expected talent strictly greater than the
expected talent of the challenger. As discussed in the introduction regard-
ing Barro (1973), it is not clear that individual voters have access to credible
commitment devices. However committing to a higher threshold has a natu-
ral interpretation with respect to the voters as a whole: a constitutional rule
such that incumbents will only be allowed a second term if they exceed some
threshold of the vote share strictly greater than one half, i.e. a supermajority
rule.
If all voters are identical then this rule, of course, has no effect. However,
if the voters differ in their preferences for the incumbent, in the way we have
assumed, then a supermajority amendment transfers the decision power from
the median voter to a voter that is ideologically opposed to the incumbent.16
16Another source of voter heterogeneity may be differential information. However if agents are rational,
and there is common knowledge of rationality, then it is difficult to argue that the heterogeneous informa-
tion will not be efficiently aggregated. Information can be indirectly passed through, for example, opinion
polls. If a voter compares her own private signal with the aggregated signals of 1000 people in an opinion
poll, then the latter would seem to swamp the former. Also voters should vote using the expectations con-
ditional on being decisive; this force will generally make a supermajority rule less effective (see Feddersen
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Therefore a supermajority rule acts in effect as a commitment device that sets
a higher threshold of talent for re-election.
Proposition 5 In the electoral competition model, the welfare maximizing re-
election rule is a supermajority rule (qW >
1
2
).
Proof Given a threshold k, there is a re-election rule that implements that
threshold in equilibrium. Denote by ek(·) the optimal effort the incumbent
exerts if he faces threshold k,17 as a function of hes types. We define q(k) as
follows:
q(k) = 1−H(θM − E[θ|s = k, ek(·)]) (17)
Clearly, setting the re-election rule q = q(k) leads to the equilibrium effort
e∗q(k)(·) ≡ ek(·) and to the equilibrium threshold kq(k) = k. To prove Proposition
5 it would be sufficient to prove that q(k) is increasing in k. However this need
not be true everywhere. As the threshold gets past a certain point both high
and low types will react to an increase in the threshold by lowering their levels
of effort (see Figure 2), thus an increase in the threshold could correspond to a
lower expected quality from a signal sent at the threshold.
To prove the result we proceed in two steps. First we show that the equation
q(k) = 1
2
has a unique solution at k∗. Then we show that q(·) is strictly
increasing at k∗, the equilibrium threshold of the simple majority case. Since
q(·) is continuous, this implies that for any k > k∗, q(k) > q(k∗) = 1
2
.
Formally, q(k) = 1
2
if and only if E[θ|s = k, ek(·)] = θM . By equation (7),
k∗ satisfies E[θ|s = k∗, ek∗(·)] = θM . To see that k∗ is the unique solution
to this equation notice that if E[θ|s = k, ek(·)] = θM , it has to be the case
that θ˜L(k) and θ˜H(k) are equidistant to the threshold k. This implies that
ek(θL) = ek(θH) = k − θM . Substituting this in the first order conditions leads
to ek(θL) = e
∗ = c′−1(pi(θH − θM)) and k = k∗.
We now show that q(k) is increasing at k∗, or equivalently, that E[θ|s =
k, ek(·)] is increasing at k∗:
∂E[θ|s = k, ek(·)]
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k=k∗
=
∂
∂k
[
(θH − θM)p[g(θ˜H − k)− g(θ˜L − k)]
p(g(θ˜H − k) + g(θ˜L − k)) + (1− 2p)g(θ˜M − k)
]∣∣∣∣∣
k=k∗
and Pesendorfer (1998)).
17The effort function ek(·) solves equation (14).
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Denoting by D the denominator of this fraction:
∂E[θ|s=k,ek(·)]
∂k
∣∣∣
k=k∗
= (θH−θM )p
D
[
g′(θ˜H − k∗)(∂eH(k∗)∂k − 1)− g′(θ˜L − k∗)(∂eL(k
∗)
∂k
− 1)
]
> 0
where the inequality follows because D > 0, g′(θ˜H − k∗) = −g′(θ˜L− k∗) < 0 by
the equilibrium condition (11) and
∂ej(k
∗)
∂k
< 1 for j ∈ {H,L} by equation (15).
Therefore, denoting by kW the welfare maximizing threshold defined by
equation (13), kW > k
∗ by Proposition 4 and therefore the optimal re-election
rule q(kW ) >
1
2
is a supermajority rule. 
6 Calibration
In this section we do a simple calibration exercise to illustrate the magnitudes
involved in our model. We assume that the noise and preference distributions
are normal. We also assume a quadratic cost of effort function, with coefficient
c
2
: c(e) = c
2
e2, and without loss of generality we set θM = 0.
The model has five free parameters (discussed below), and we do not esti-
mate all those parameters. Instead we have two modest goals. First, to show
that a set of parameters which seem intuitively reasonable (to the authors at
least) can reproduce incumbency effects of the right magnitude. Second, to
show that the implications for an optimal supermajority rule and its welfare
effects are also of an intuitive magnitude.
We target the causal incumbency advantage numbers reported in Lee (2008).
That paper uses a regression discontinuity analysis on U.S. Congressional elec-
tions, and finds that the difference in the probability of winning an election
between a marginal winner and a marginal loser (i.e., a winner or loser of the
previous election) is 35%, and that the difference in the average vote share is
of 7-8%.18
The free parameters of the model are (1) the variance of the noise distribu-
tion σ2 , (2) the variance of the voters’ preferences σ
2
η, (3) the dispersion of the
18These numbers correspond to the party rather than the candidate incumbency advantage and average
vote share advantage. The problem with the establishment of a candidate incumbency advantage is that
there is an endogenous attrition of candidates that distorts the results.
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talent distribution δ = θH − θM , (4) the probability of the high and low types
p, and (5) the relative cost of effort is c (we normalise pi = 1).19
Given the quadratic cost and the normal distributions, the equilibrium of
the model is the following:
eH = eL = e
∗ = 1
cσ
φ( δ
σ
)
eM =
1
cσ
φ( eM−e
∗
σ
)
k = 1
cσ
φ( δ
σ
)
(18)
where φ(·) is the standard Normal density distribution.
The probability of winning for an incumbent is given by equation (11) and
hence the difference in the probability of winning between the incumbent and
the challenger is:
x = 2Pr(reelection)− 1 = (1− 2p)
(
1− 2Φ
(
k∗ − eM
σ
))
(19)
where Φ(·) is the standard Normal cumulative distribution.
Note that Lee (2008) computes the difference in the probability of winning
between a marginal winner and a marginal loser. This avoids the problem
of unobserved heterogeneity between winners and losers, if there is sufficient
unpredictable noise in votes. Posterior differences between a bare winner and
loser thus must be caused by the fact of winning or losing. In our model, all the
politicians come from the same distribution of talents and therefore they are
ex-ante identical and the difference in the probability of winning comes entirely
from having been incumbent.
To compute the average vote share, note that given a signal s the share
of voters that support the incumbent is H(E[θ|s]) (see equation (4) for the
individual voting rule). Hence the average vote share is given by:
AV S =
∑
j∈{L,M,H}
Pr(θj)
∫
H(E[θ|s]) g(s|θ˜j)ds (20)
19The sufficient condition (6) is translated in the following restriction for the parameters:
c ≥ 1
σ2
√
2pi
e−
1
2
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and the difference in the average vote share between the incumbent and the
challenger is
y = AV S − (1− AV S)
We choose the parameters as follows: the difference in quality between θH
and θM is δ = 1.4 (which by symmetry is also the difference between θM and θL).
The probability of the middle type is (1 − 2p) = 0.7. The noise has standard
deviation σ = 1, and voters’ preferences have standard deviation ση =
1
2
.
Finally the cost of effort is c
pi
= 1
4
. These parameters deliver an incumbency
advantage matching Lee’s estimates, with a difference in the probability of
winning of 35% and a difference in the average vote share of 7%.
We can now calculate, using equations (13) and (17), that the optimal su-
permajority rule is qW = 57%. This supermajority rule then leads to a welfare
increase of 5%, by lowering the proportion of low-quality candidates who are
re-elected.
7 Discussion
This paper suggests that if incumbents can use their term in office to influence
the voters’ perception of their ability, handicapping the incumbent by requiring
a higher vote share to be re-elected can improve welfare.
Throughout the paper we have assumed the incumbent faces only a single
challenger. To implement our supermajority rule in practice we suggest a two-
part ballot: In the first part voters indicate whether they wish to retain the
incumbent. In the second part they choose their preferred challenger. This
has the advantage of not handicapping the incumbent’s party for example, the
Republican incumbent can run, and the Republicans can also field a challenger.
This ballot structure has been used in some recall elections, e.g. that used for
California Governor Gray Davis in 2003.
The type of model we use (screening with noise, in a continuous typespace,
but with a discrete reward) is uncommon in the literature. As mentioned
earlier, Matthews and Mirman (1983) has the most similar model, though they
do not derive analogues of either our incumbency advantage or supermajority
results. Besides limit pricing, our approach may be fruitful in a number of other
contexts in which thresholds are observed, most naturally entry into jobs which
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require a minimum score on some test of skill.
A useful extension would be to build a model extending over more than two
periods, allowing incumbents to fight multiple elections, and perhaps finding
a stationary equilibrium. Unfortunately this is not a simple exercise because
two new effects must be modeled: first, the posterior distribution of incumbent
types will become asymmetric, through selection; second, voters must now take
into account the option value of electing a challenger.
Finally we note that the incumbency advantage and supermajority result
can also be shown to occur in a much simpler model with na¨ıve voters. Sup-
pose that there are two kinds of voters - sophisticated and na¨ıve - and that the
preferences of the median sophisticated voter coincide with social welfare. Sup-
pose na¨ıve voters always vote for the incumbent because, for example, they are
irrationally influenced by advertising, and incumbents always advertise more
than challengers. In this case we would expect an incumbency advantage equal
to x% of the vote share, where x is the proportion of voters who are na¨ıve. Fur-
ther, a supermajority handicap on the incumbent of exactly x% would make
the democratic outcome welfare maximizing. Much of the novelty of this paper
is to show that similar results hold even when voters are rational.
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Comparisons and Choice∗
September 30, 2011
Abstract
This paper shows that a wide variety of framing and menu effects can all
be derived from a representation of relative thinking, in which increasing a
comparator along some dimension will decrease marginal sensitivity along
that dimension (i.e., it will lower the marginal rate of substitution). I
establish that two well-documented framing effects, the effect of contrast
and of anchors, both imply and are implied by this representation of relative
thinking. It also implies two menu effects: scope neglect and generalised
diminishing sensitivity. I show how menu effects can be identified by using
the difference between joint and separate choice. I show that the relative
thinking effect would be a rational response to a situation in which relative
position is a good proxy for an unobserved true value. However the effect
occurs even in experiments which rule out informational effects, thus I
suggest the effect can be thought of as a heuristic in the sense of Tversky
and Kahneman (1974).
1 Introduction
This paper shows the consequences of comparison effects – also known as relative
thinking – on choice behaviour.
∗I have benefited greatly from comments by Ruchir Agarwal, Francesco Caselli, Erik Eyster,
David Laibson, Andrei Shleifer, Tomasz Strzalecki, Matthew Rabin and seminar participants at
Harvard and LSE.
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One of the most robust findings from the experimental study of human percep-
tion is that judgments of objective quantities (such as length, loudness, brightness)
are influenced by comparisons, such that subjects’ estimates of magnitude are de-
creasing in the magnitude of the comparator. Put another way: when an item is
in a context in which it is relatively small, people tend to judge it to be absolutely
small.
A natural question is whether this bias affects economic choice through alter-
ing judgments of value. This paper shows that a comparison effect, or relative
thinking, indeed has predictions for choice in a wide range of settings, and unifies
many observed anomalies in choice across various domains.
Analogous to judgments of magnitude, judgments of value can be elicited by
asking for willingness to pay, or more generally for a match on another dimension,
i.e. asking a question of the form “What value of m would make you indifferent
between (xi, xj) and (x′i,m)?”.1 Experimental evidence (discussed later) shows
that this type of decision is affected by comparator in the same way that percep-
tual judgments are affected. This paper first establishes that, if preferences are
represented with a utility function, then comparators change the marginal rate of
substitution between goods. If the magnitude of a comparator along dimension i
is represented as ci, the effect can be summarised as:
∂|MRSi,j(x)|
∂ci
< 0
This expression has a simple graphical representation: because the MRS repre-
sents the slope of an indifference curve at some point, an increase in a comparator
along the horizontal dimension causes a flattening of a consumer’s indifference
curves. I show that this representation of comparator effects fits laboratory evi-
dence across a variety of domains and elicitation methods, described variously as
sequence effects, anchoring effects, and denominator effects.
I then turn to choice set effects, treating the elements of the choice set them-
selves as comparators. A difficulty with all theories of choice set effects has been
disentangling two different ways in which alternatives can affect decisions: first,
1Answers can be made incentive compatible (at least for subjects whose choices obey the
axiom of independence) using the system of Becker et al. (1964).
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a direct effect through their attributes; and second, an indirect effect through
changing the decision-maker’s preferences. To solve this problem I introduce evi-
dence from joint choice: i.e., where two independent choice sets are presented side
by side, for simultaneous consideration. I argue that violations of revealed prefer-
ence tend to disappear under a joint choice treatment, meaning that a set of joint
choices can be represented as all using the same utility function, thus allowing us
to separate the direct and indirect effects of the choice set on decision-making.
The model predicts a number of observed choice set effects. Generalising, it pre-
dicts that behaviour will appear to exhibit extreme diminishing sensitivity across
a variety of elicitation modes, because shifting the choice set out along one di-
mension will lower sensitivity to that dimension. The principal novel prediction
of this model is that diminishing sensitivity will be greatly reduced in joint choice.
What evidence there is from joint choice seems to support that prediction.
Turning finally to interpretation, recent research in psychology shows that
comparator effects in perception can be elegantly explained as optimal inferences
from the environment under plausible constraints. When there is a common un-
observed factor which affects all perceptions, then information about relative po-
sition can convey information about that unobserved factor, thus rationalising a
contrast effect. This, however, does not explain why people still seem to exhibit
the same systematic biases when comparators are known to convey no informa-
tion. I thus suggest that relative thinking can be thought of as a heuristic in
the sense of Tversky and Kahneman (1974), i.e. a rule which is optimal in most
circumstances, but fails to condition on all available information and thus gives
rise to systematic biases.
2 Comparator Effects on Choice
William James described a feature of perception in his Principles of Psychology
(1890)2
A bright object appears still brighter when its surroundings are
darker than itself, and darker when they are brighter than itself.
2James (1890)
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This effect is known in psychology as a “contrast effect”: when judgment of objec-
tive magnitude is negatively affected by the magnitude of a comparator. James
described contrast effects for judgment of brightness, of hue, and of temperature,
and he claimed that the contrast effect works both when a comparator is perceived
at the same time as the target object (simultaneous contrast), or just prior (se-
quential contrast). Subsequent literature has documented contrast effects using
experiments rather than introspection, across many domains of perception and
judgment.3 The effect of contrast on judgment is what underlies a whole family
of optical illusions: a pair of identical objects look different when each is placed
beside a different object; this generates a set of distinct illusions based either on
the object’s brightness, contrast, colour, or its size.
Turning to economics, similar contrast effects seem to occur in experimental
judgments of preference. Day and Pinto Prades (2010) survey sequence effects in
the contingent valuation literature: the WTP for a given good tends to fall as
the size of the preceding good increases. Sequence effects have also been found in
the field, for example when marking exams, judging cases, or meeting potential
dates, judgment on the present case tends to be lower if the preceding stimulus was
higher (Bhargava (2008)). Bartels (2006) summarises a literature on “denominator
effects”, in which the willingness to pay (WTP) for some good is affected by the
size of the pool from which it is drawn. For example, in one case the WTP to
save 10 lives from a disease was much higher when subjects are told 20 lives are at
risk, than when they are told 100 lives are at risk. Similarly, Hsee (1998) reports
that the WTP for a given amount of ice cream is much lower when he increased
the size of the container in which it is placed.4
Unfortunately none of the experiments in this literature is without flaws. First,
the preferences are often not elicited using incentive compatible techniques (e.g.
the Becker et al. (1964) mechanism to elicit WTP). In fact most of the experi-
3See Parducci (1995) for a review of literature on simultaneous contrast. Regarding sequential
contrast Stewart et al. (2006) say, surveying results from across many domains of perception,
“the details of the results depend somewhat on the experimental task but the general pattern
is robust: The response on the current trial is biased [...] away from the stimulus presented on
[the previous] trial.” Note also that the effect of interest is objective judgment, e.g. which of two
cards is lighter, or how long is a line in centimetres.
4Hsee shows that this is not due to preferences defined over containers: the WTP depends
only on the amount of ice cream when judgments are made side by side.
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ments asked hypothetical questions. Second, none of these experiments explicitly
randomised the magnitude of the comparator. This seems especially likely when
subjects judge the value of goods expressed in unfamiliar units. Nevertheless I
begin with this somewhat weak evidence for contrast effects to motivate the model
in this paper, and I then show that the model can explain a variety of other ob-
served regularities, some of which are better documented than the contrast effect
itself.
2.1 Model
The model of relative judgment I introduce in this paper is, under certain assump-
tions, a unique representation of the contrast effect. The novelty is to allow the
utility function to depend on a set of comparators; intuitively, I assume that peo-
ple make tradeoffs at different, and inconsistent, rates which depend on irrelevant
details of the context.
The model predicts the comparative statics with respect to the position of
a given comparator, but it makes no prediction about how choice is affected by
introducing or removing a comparator.
In this paper I do not specify how to identify the set of comparators in a given
situation. The set of comparators can thus be thought of as free variables, or un-
observables, when testing the theory. In most of the experimental evidence cited,
however, it is relatively clear whether something is a comparator. Dependence
on unobservables is a common problem among non-standard theories of decision-
making. For example, in reference-point theories, such as prospect theory, pre-
dictions differ depending on the reference point.5 The problem of falsifiability is
not so severe for this model: it says that the comparative statics of choice with
respect to any comparator will be uniform. Thus if any irrelevant comparator
affects choice in the wrong direction, the theory is rejected. This differs from
reference point theories with unobservable reference points, in which almost any
choice can be rationalised by some reference point (Gul and Pesendorfer (2006)).
Let the choice set be A = {x1, .., xm}, with each alternative xi having at-
5Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) give a reference point theory in which the reference point is
the lagged rationally expected outcome, thus depending only on the objective attributes of the
choice set (plus an assumption about how long the lag is).
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tributes along n dimensions, i.e. xi = {xi1, .., xin} ∈ Rn. Then define a super-set
of comparators C = {c1, .., cn} where each element ci is a set of comparators
along dimension i, labeled ci = {c1i , .., coi}. I allow choices to depend on the set of
comparators, i.e. U(x|C). The common assumption about comparator effects on
preferences, which we will use for the rest of the paper, is as follows:
Definition 1. A utility function U(x|C) exhibits relative thinking if, for every
1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and comparator cki , with 0 ≤ k ≤ m ,
∂
∂cki
MRSi,j ≡ ∂
∂cki
∂U/∂xi
∂U/∂xj
< 0
The claim is that when the comparator shifts out along some dimension then
the utility function becomes everywhere less sensitive to that dimension. Figure
1 gives a graphical representation of how choices are affected by the position of a
comparator. Because the MRS falls, the indifference curves rotate anti-clockwise
to become more parallel with the x dimension. Thus, alternative B’s advantage
in x becomes less important relative to A’s advantage on the y dimension, so in
this case choice will change from indifference to strict preference for alternative
A.
rA
rB
ci
rA
rB
-
ci
Figure 1: The Effect of a Comparator on Indifference Curves
As the comparator ci shifts out along the i axis, the MRSi,j everywhere declines,
thus rotating indifference curves counter-clockwise.
Some intuitive examples across different domains are as follows. A $1 difference
between alternatives will comes to seem less important when considered in the
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context of larger amounts of money. A 1% difference in probabilities between
alternatives will come to seem less important when considered in the context
of larger probabilities. A 1 day delay will come to seem less important when
considered in the context of longer delays.
I first show that this representation is not only sufficient but necessary for a
contrast effect to occur in matching. Note first how willingness to pay is deter-
mined in a utility function. Given an endowment x, then for some increment τi
along dimension i its matched value is equal to an increment vj along dimension
j, i.e.6
U(xi, xj, x−i,j) = U(xi + τi, xj − vj(τi), x−i,j)
Assuming that U is continuous, strictly increasing, and unbounded in each of its
arguments then a unique matched value vj(τi) will always exist. I will often use
WTP (τ) as a short-hand for vj(τi), though the results are true for matching on
any good, not just for WTP, which is matching on the money dimension.
The theory makes two predictions about the effect of comparators on WTP
judgments. First, when valuing some quantity along dimension x, an increase
in a comparator along the same dimension will tend to reduce the judged WTP.
Evidence for this has already been discussed. However the model also predicts the
opposite effect for comparators along the price dimension. When judging WTP
a higher price comparator will lower the relative marginal utility of money, thus
raising the amount of money required to make the subject indifferent.
Proposition 1. The following are equivalent:
(i) the absolute value of the marginal rate of substitution MRSi,j = ∂U/∂xi∂U/∂xj is
everywhere continuous and strictly decreasing in a comparator Ci along dimension
i
(ii) the matched value vj for a positive increment τi is continuous and strictly
decreasing in a comparator along dimension i
(iii) the matched value vj for a positive increment τi is continuous and strictly
increasing in a comparator along dimension j
6Define x−i,j as the vector x minus the entries for i and j. Note the notation is implicitly
redefining the order of the elements in the utility function.
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The new prediction (iii) is supported by a variety of evidence. Best-known is
the anchoring effect, where the subject is asked “is this worth more than $p?”,
and then asked for their willingness to pay. If we consider $p a comparator along
the money dimension, this predicts, as is observed, a higher p is associated with
higher reported willingness to pay (the literature is surveyed in Chapman and
Johnson (2002), and a good example of a conservative test with strong results is
in Fudenberg et al. (2010)).
A similar effect is observed in contingent valuation studies (summarised in
Day and Pinto Prades (2010)): in these studies subjects are asked a sequence
of two questions about whether they would pay a certain amount of money for
some good. A higher monetary value in the first question is associated with an
increased likelihood of accepting the offer in the second question, all else equal.7
Finally, it is worth noting that psychological studies also find that compara-
tors along the response dimension tend to have the same effect, of raising the
matched value. In the psychology literature this is called an “assimilation effect,”
as opposed to a “contrast effect” (see Stewart et al. (2003)).
3 The Elements of the Choice Set as Compara-
tors
Suppose we think of the elements of a choice set as themselves comparators, then
the model described will immediately make some intuitive predictions.
For example, consider a WTP task, where subjects are asked to state a value
for some quantity τ . If we treat the quantity τ as itself a comparator, preferences
will be affected by its magnitude, such that subjects asked about a larger quan-
tity will be relatively less sensitive to that good. Nnote that this is not simply
diminishing marginal sensitivity; it could be called diminishing infra-marginal
sensitivity. Thus the model predicts that WTP will grow less quickly than it
would without this effect; roughly speaking, the relative-thinking effect will make
WTP (τ) less elastic than it otherwise would be.
7The protocol here is choice, rather than matching, but the same comparative statics will
hold.
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This prediction is obviously difficult to test because it is only a prediction
relative to an underlying utility function, which is not directly observable. We
cannot know how elastic the WTP function would be without this relative thinking
effect. The problem is that changes in the choice set now affect observed choice
in two ways: directly, in the usual way, holding preferences fixed; and indirectly,
through their effect on the preferences themselves.
The ideal experiment would manipulate the direct and indirect effects inde-
pendently. This is clearly not possible under the model as it stands. However
one further assumption would allow this: if, when making joint choices, subjects
used the same utility function across each choice set. For example suppose that
subjects are asked two questions at once: to state their WTP both for 5 ounces
and for 10 ounces of ice cream. Both prompts now serve as comparators, and
if the two decisions are made drawing from the same set of preferences then by
manipulating one of the choice sets, and observing the effect on choice from the
other set, we can separate the direct and indirect effects.
In this section I introduce notation for dealing with joint choice; I give evidence
for the assumption necessary to use joint choice as evidence on choice set effects;
and finally demonstrate the specific predictions made by this model.
3.1 Context Dependent Choice
The primitive in this model will be choice from a joint choice set, i.e. c(A|A) ⊆ A,
where A is a set of choice sets, and A ∈ A. I mean that choice is joint if the choice
sets are offered for simultaneous consideration, but only one choice, randomly
selected, is implemented.8
The crucial assumption is that the strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP)
applies among choices within any joint choice set; i.e., I assume that the choices
are acyclic, people do not simultaneously revealed prefer a to b, and b to a.9 This
8The joint choice set A is of course itself a choice set. We could say any choice set A is a
joint choice between the set of choice sets {A1, ..., An} if there exist probabilities ∑ni=1 pi = 1
such that A = (A1, p1)× ..× (An, pn), i.e. the set containing every combination of alternatives
from each member choice set, multiplied by the probabilities associated with each set. For
example the choice sets {A,B} and {X,Y, Z} could be combined into the joint choice set:
{(A, p;X, 1− p), (A, p;Y, 1− p), (A, p;Z, 1− p), (B, p;X, 1− p), (B, p;Y, 1− p), (B, p;Z, 1− p)}.
9See Richter (1966) and Mas-Colell (1982) for details.
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would be violated if, for example, when offered the two choice sets {x, y} and
{x, y, z}, you choose x from one, and y from the other. Satisfaction of the SARP
guarantees that there exists at least one utility function which rationalizes the
joint choices made, thus we can define a utility function U(x|A).10,11
If the axiom of independence holds, then of course c(Ai|A) = c(Ai), because
the alternative choice sets do not affect your choice from set i. That axiom rules
out menu effects of the kind we are interested in. Some theories of choice weaken
the axiom of independence to deal with comparison of outcomes in independent
legs of a gamble (e.g. Gul (1991), Bordalo et al. (2010), and Kőszegi and Rabin
(2006)) often described as a kind of disappointment-avoidance effect. I ignore that
effect here, because it appears that the regret/disappointment effect depends a
lot on framing; so that if choices are presented explicitly as separate choice sets,
subjects ignore the regret/disappointment effect. This has been the finding of
literature on the use of the random-lottery incentive mechanism: Hey and Lee
(2005) survey evidence that subjects do not appear to treat a series of choice sets
in the same way as one large meta-choice set (this is related to the failure of the
axiom of reduction of compound lotteries).12
What evidence is there that subjects are consistent when they make choices
jointly?
I first discuss framing effects, because choice set dependence can be considered
a subset of framing effects.13 Does the effect of a frame on choice disappear when
decisions are made side by side? This is often assumed to be true, but rarely tested.
The paper which first documented a variety of many framing effects (Tversky and
Kahneman (1986)) says that “the major finding of the present article is that the
10Strictly we should write U(x|C(A)), with C(A) is the set of comparators in the whole joint
choice set. For the remainder of the paper I will leave this implicit.
11Spiegler (2011) makes a related point: if framing effects disappear when both frames are
presented, then it is difficult to study these effects using the Krepsian paradigm of choice between
choice sets.
12A related issue is “choice bracketing”, described in Tversky and Kahneman (1986) and Rabin
and Weizsacker (2009). They ask subjects to choose from both of two choice sets at once. The
difference from joint choice as used in this paper, is that both choices were implemented, thus the
agents should consider interactions (complementarity, substitutability) between the outcomes.
13The formalism can also be easily transposed to pure framing effects, using a choice function
like c(A|F ), where F represents the frame, as in Salant and Rubinstein (2008); Bernheim and
Rangel (2007).
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axioms of rational choice are generally satisfied in transparent situations and often
violated in non-transparent ones.”
I now turn to choice set dependence. The simplest tests would be of this form:
when between-subject studies find violations of the weak axiom, e.g. by choosing
x from {x, y, z} and y from {x, y}, then an ideal experiment would be to present
subjects with the two choice sets jointly, to see if the inconsistency survives. I am
not aware of such a direct experiment being run, however we do have evidence
from preference reversals. For the case of classic preference reversals (Lichtenstein
and Slovic (1971))14 Ordóñez et al. (1995) found that when subjects are asked to
make all three judgments simultaneously (i.e., a choice and two WTA judgments),
preference reversals decreased significantly, and were almost eliminated when the
game was played for real stakes. Hsee (1998) gives examples in which irrelevant
attributes affect the WTP for certain objects, e.g. the WTP for a given amount of
ice cream changes significantly as the size of the cup increases, yet when judging
payments side by side, both amounts of ice cream are given the same WTP.
Similarly Mazar et al. (2009) find that WTP differs that differences in preferences
disappear in joint evaluation.15
We thus proceed under the assumption that SARP holds in joint choice, al-
lowing us to test theories of menu effects.16
4 Members of the Choice Set as Comparators
4.1 Scope Neglect
First I consider how choice set comparators affect behaviour in a matching task;
most experimental matching tasks are done with money, so I will denote the
14In which a majority of subjects choose one of a pair of bets, but in valuation the average
selling price (WTA) is higher for the other bet.
15Strictly speaking, in none of these studies did the choices made separately violate the strong
axiom of revealed preference, because in a continuous matching task each alternative is unique,
so cycles cannot be constructed. However in each case they would violate the strong axiom if
we add decisions in which people simply prefer more money to less.
16Note that joint choice does not allow us to map out the entire function u(x|A). For example,
suppose some choice set A induces only in parts of the attribute space outside of the domain of
alternatives in A: such a prediction is untestable.
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matching function WTP (τ |A), although the results are not specific to money.17
The model gives a clear prediction for matching: as the magnitude of x in-
creases the utility function will become relatively less sensitive to that dimension,
thus diminishing the judgment of willingness to pay. For example, if the under-
lying WTP function (i.e., the WTP function holding the comparator effect fixed)
was a linear function, then the comparator effect would cause it to have decreasing
returns to scale, i.e. WTP (λτ) < λWTP (τ) for λ > 1.18
As mentioned, elicitation of WTP through a BDM mechanism requires a fairly
complex choice set. I abbreviate a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) choice set
used to elicit the value of τ by denoting it just A(τ).
Proposition 2. If the matching function WTP (τ |A) is linear for a fixed A, and
it exhibits relative thinking, then the WTP function will be inelastic,
dWTP (τ |{A(τ)})
dτ
τ
WTP (τ |{A(τ)}) < 1
Turning to data, there is strong evidence for decreasing returns to scale in
matching, though the literature has used different descriptions for this phenomenon
in different domains.
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) cite a range of evidence for what they describe
as “scope neglect” in judgments of willingness to pay, where subjects report sim-
ilar judgments of WTP for very different magnitudes of some good.19 In the
best-known example (from Desvousges et al. (1993)) subjects were asked their
willingness to pay to save birds from death in oil ponds. The mean WTPs for
17The relationship between a matching function and a choice set, which I take as primitive,
is not trivial. Suppose that matching is done using a BDM mechanism (i.e., a 2nd price auction
against a random number), with one hundred one-dollar increments from $0 to $99. In this
case the choice set contains 100 members each of which is a lottery, for example choosing a $2
valuation is equivalent to a lottery with four outcomes: a 1% chance each of (x, $0) , (x,−$1),
(x,−$2), and a 97% chance of (0, 0). This is a complicated choice set, and there is not a unique
representation in terms of trading off different goods. For the purposes of this paper I treat
the WTP judgment as a joint choice of 100 different choice sets (each implemented with equal
probability) of the form (x, p) and (0, 0), then we can represent the outcome along just two
dimensions, x and p, and apply the theory directly. I discuss further the problem of alternative
representations of a choice set towards the end of the paper.
18This can also be described as having local homogeneity everywhere below 1, or having
elasticity everywhere below 1.
19See also discussion in Frederick and Fischhoff (1998)
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WTP (τ |{A(τ)})
WTP (τ |{A(3), A(6)})
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Figure 2: Separate and Joint WTP functions
The graph shows two WTP functions. The concave line represents WTP condi-
tioned just on its argument, τ . The curvature comes from marginal sensitivity
to τ everwhere decreasing as τ increases. The straight line represents the utility
function evoked by the joint choice set A = {A(3), A(6)}. By our assumption any
WTP function conditioned on a fixed A is linear.
saving 2,000, 20,000, or 200,000 birds were $80, $78, and $88, respectively.20
Before going on it is important to note that there is an error in the usual
description of these effects. They are generally called anomalies of “insensitivity”
or “neglect”, and explained as anomalous because WTP judgments are either
entirely insensitive to x, or there is “nearly complete” neglect of scope, i.e. the
slope of the line is very small.21 However a better description would be that the
evidence shows low elasticity in willingness to pay.
There are two ways of explaining the problem. First, if we assume that a
zero quantity of some good is always judged to have zero value (zero birds saved,
zero probability of harm, etc.) then it is impossible that scope neglect occurs
throughout the entire range; if the slope is extremely flat at one point, then it
must be correspondingly steep near the origin. Second, the observed slopes of the
20Carson (1997) argues against the existence of scope neglect, but only going so far as saying
that there is some response to scope. For example, he cites a study which finds an average
WTP of $3.78 to prevent 0.04 deaths per 100,000 per year, and $15.23 to prevent 243 deaths
per 100,000 per year. This shows that there is not complete neglect of scope, yet the function
is very far from linear (the implied value of a statistical life is $9.5 million in the former case,
and $6,300 in the latter).
21Kahneman et al. (1999)define insensitivity to scope as “the quantitative attribute has little
weight in the valuation. ”
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WTP functions are not in themselves anomalous. Suppose that the willingness
to pay for saving 2,000 birds was $101 and the willingness to pay for 20,000 birds
was $110 - this would seem to be an anomaly. But if the WTPs were instead
$1 and $10, although the slope of the function is the same, WTP is now a linear
function of quantity, and it does not seem an anomaly.
Thus the slope is not the anomalous part of people’s choices, it is the elasticity.
Suppose WTP = τ 1/10, then when τ increases by a factor of 10, willingness to
pay will increase by only 101/10 = 1.25.
Finally, the theory here predicts that in joint choice, the WTP function should
have a much lower elasticity. This is exactly what is found by Hsee and Zhang
(2010), in comparing WTP for chocolates, judged jointly and separately. Although
using sequential choice, not joint, Kahneman and Frederick (2002) also report that
subjects show much greater responsiveness to the x variable in within-subjects
experiments than in between-subjects experiments.
4.2 Common Difference Effects
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) documented strange preferences in purchase de-
cisions: they found that one group of subjects were likely to choose to walk 20
minutes to buy a product for $10 instead of $15. However another group of sub-
jects were unwilling to walk 20 minutes to buy a product for $120 instead of $125.
This is surprising because subjects for whom money enters into their utility func-
tions in a linearly separable way should make the same decision in both cases (and
if the utility of money was concave and separable, then they would tend to make
the opposite reversal, choosing to walk for the large amount of money and not for
the small). A survey of similar evidence can be found in Azar (2007).
The two choice sets can be represented as
{($20, 20m), ($25, 0m)}
{($120, 20m), ($125, 0m)}
The alternatives in the second choice set are identical to those in the first, except
for being translated out along the money dimension by $100 (this is why I have
called this phenomenon a “common difference” effect). One interpretation of this
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(a) The diminishing sensitivity explanation:
both choice use the same utility function, so
there must be diminishing MRS along the x di-
mension.
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(b) The relative thinking explanation: each
choice set induces a different utility function, but
each has parallel indifference curves (i.e., each is
quasilinear in money)
Figure 3: Two Models of a Common Difference Effect, where A ∼ B, but A′ ¼ B′
behaviour is that subjects have diminishing sensitivity to money in this choice;
this is the interpretation given in Tversky and Kahneman (1981). An alternative
interpretation is given by the model of relative thinking in this paper: treating
the two alternatives as comparators, the shift out will lower marginal sensitivity
to money, predicting a reversal of preferences as found in the experiment. The
two interpretations are illustrated graphically in Figure 2.
Proposition 3. If preferences are neutral with respect to a common difference
along dimension i for any fixed A, i.e. for τ > 0,
(x11, x12) ²A (x21, x22) ⇐⇒ (x11, x12 + τ) ²A (x21, x22 + τ)
and the utility function displays relative thinking, then a common difference
effect will occur for separate choice, i.e. for τ > 0,
(x11, x12) ∼A′ (x21, x22) ⇒ (x11, x12 + τ) ≺A′′ (x21, x22 + τ)
where A′ = {{(x11, x12), (x21, x22)}}
and A′′ = {{(x11, x12 + τ), (x21, x22 + τ)}}
and x12 > x22
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Tversky and Kahneman (1981) explain the jacket/calculator results as due to
diminishing sensitivity in the valuation of changes in wealth, evaluated using a
concave function v(·), “[B]y the curvature of v, a discount of $5 has a greater
impact when the price of the calculator is low than when it is high.” It is worth
noting that this explanation implicitly sets a reference point: the reference point
is at paying nothing, i.e. at not purchasing the product. This is in contrast to
most applications of prospect theory to purchase behaviour, where the reference
point is set at the purchase of the good, and changes are evaluated relative to
that point (e.g. in Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) the reference point is the rationally
expected outcome; in this situation it would seem to be purchase at one store
or other). If the reference point is purchase, then the comparison of gain-loss
utility is a comparison between v(0) and v(5)22, which does not change in the two
scenarios, and thus would not predict the effect.
The proposition given has a clear prediction: that the diminishing sensitivity
will disappear in joint choice. I am not aware of any published experiments which
have tried this experiment.
Common difference effects also occur in other domains, usually interpreted as
evidence for diminishing sensitivity, though relative thinking may be involved. In
inter-temporal choice, if two delayed rewards are offered (one smaller and sooner,
one larger and later), then preferences are often reversed in favour of the larger-
later reward when both rewards are pushed back in time by a common amount
(Green et al. (1994), and see Frederick et al. (2002) for a survey). In risky choice
the common difference effect is also known as the Allais paradox (Allais (1953)):
increasing the probabilities of a common prize should not change preferences be-
tween gambles, according to expected utility, but it does. Intuitively the effect is
also seen in Zeckhauser’s paradox: if playing Russian roulette, it seems to many
people more valuable to remove the last and only bullet from the gun, than to
remove the 4th bullet, although both actions decrease your chance of death by
1/6.
22Or v(−5) and v(0), if purchase from the other store is the reference point.
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5 Inference Interpretation
In this section I will first show under what conditions a relative thinking effect
would arise from an optimal inference. The model has a close resemblance to
recent models from cognitive science, modeling perception as Bayesian inference.
I then discuss how optimal inference can be reconciled with people making sys-
tematic mistakes.
5.1 An Inference Interpretation of Relative Thinking
To introduce the inference interpretation, I briefly return to discuss perception.
For a long time psychological work on perception and illusions was concerned
with giving neurological explanations, describing mechanisms, without explaining
why people should be subject to biases which seem easily fixed. Recent work
instead interprets illusions as by-products of optimal inference from incomplete
information (Kersten et al. (2004)). The visual information arriving on a retina
is necessarily too weak to license any strict deductions about what is being seen;
instead, inferences must be made using prior beliefs.
A common form of optical illusion is to show two identical stimuli, each sur-
rounded by different backgrounds. The backgrounds differ either in brightness
(lightness contrast illusion), in hue (color contrast), in size (Ebbinghaus illusion),
or in contrast (Chubb illusion). In each case the two stimuli, although identical,
appear to be different, such that each one’s relative difference against their back-
ground appears to be an absolute difference. For example, the stimulus which is
against a dark background seems lighter, the stimulus which is surrounded with
large shapes seems smaller, etc.
There is a very elegant Bayesian inference explanation for each of these il-
lusions.23 Suppose there are two stimuli, x and y, of unknown magnitude, and
the subject receives noisy signals xˆ and yˆ, and then forms judgments E[x|xˆ, yˆ]
and E[y|xˆ, yˆ]. The illusions can be thought of as showing that dE[x|xˆ,yˆ]
dy
< 0, i.e.
judgment of the magnitude of one stimulus is decreasing in the magnitude of a
neighbour. This will in fact be a rational inference if, for example, the signals
23See Kersten et al. (2004)
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share a common multiplicative error,
xˆ = x/β
yˆ = y/β
where x, y and β are distributed such that the monotone likelihood ratio applies
for the pairs {xˆ, β} and {yˆ, β}, so that dE[β|yˆ]
dyˆ
< 0. Thus the expectation will
become
dE[x|xˆ, yˆ]
dyˆ
= xˆdE[β|xˆ, yˆ]
dyˆ
< 0
Unobserved common factors occur in many domains of perception, thus gener-
ating contrast effects. In an illusion of differing lightness, an unobserved common
factor is the brightness of light incident upon the scene. As you receive more light
from an object you revise upwards both your estimate of the reflectivity of the
object, and your estimate of the incident light. If the adjacent objects are known
to receive the same incident light, then increasing your estimate of the incident
light will cause you to decrease your estimate of the reflectivity of the second
object. In this way light backgrounds tend to make objects look darker, even for
perfectly rational subjects.
In the other optical illusions there are similar explanations through unobserved
variables. For an illusion of hue, it is the hue of the incident light. For an illusion
of size, it is the distance of objects. For contrast, it is the haziness of the air.
To summarise, existence of a common unobserved factor can explain contrast
effects: because relative observed magnitude is a good proxy for absolute magni-
tude.
Transposing this idea from judgment to choice, there exists a simple model of
inference that will give rise to relative thinking. The technical difference is just
that in choice we usually treat the magnitudes (x’s) as known, but the impor-
tance of each attribute (β) is a matter of judgment. The following are sufficient
conditions for relative thinking:
Definition 2. A decision-maker is described as having monotonically un-
known separable preferences if
(i) they have a utility function U(x1, ..., xn) = E
[∑n
i=1
fi(xi)
hi(βi)
]
with fi and hi both
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smooth and strictly increasing functions
(ii) all xs are known, but βs are unknown to the decision-maker (the DM has a
prior over each β)
(iii) the DM believes each comparator ci ∈ C (which includes all the alternatives
in A) to be iid draws from a distribution Gi(ci|βi), which satisfies the monotonic
likelihood ratio with respect to ci and βi24.
Proposition 4. If the DM can be described as having monotonically unknown
separable preferences then
d
dci
∂E[U(x)|C]/∂xi
∂E[U(x)|C]/∂xj < 0
Note that the decision-maker must take the expectation of utility, because the
β’s are uncertain. Thus proposition 4 shows the effect of a comparator on the
marginal rate of substitution, reproducing the relative thinking effect.
An agent with preferences of this kind will thus rationally exhibit all the effects
we have discussed as anomolies: contrast, anchoring, scope neglect, and common
difference.
A simple parametric example can be given, restricting comparators to just
the choice set {x1, .., xn}. Suppose U(x) = E∑i xiβi , with ln(xi) ∼ N(βi, σ2i ) and
priors over the β’s such that ln(βi) ∼ N(µi, s2i ). Then utility will be
E[U(x)] =
∑
i
xiE[β−1i ]
=
∑
i
xiexp{−E[ln(βi)]− 12V [ln(βi)]}
=
∑
i
xiexp
{
−s
−2
i µi + σ−2i
∑
j ln(xji )
s−2i + nσ−2x
− 12(s
−2
i + nσ−2i )
}
This utility function has two interesting properties. First, suppose that utility is
linear in money, so using it as numeraire we can express willingness to pay for
an increment τi as WTP (τi) = E[U(τi)] (suppressing the other arguments in the
utility function). Then, in this model, the WTP function will have elasticity of
exactly 1 in joint evaluation (we have already assumed that the utility function
24I.e. gi(R
′,β′)
gi(R,β′) >
gi(R′,β)
gi(R,β) for R
′ > R, β′ > β.
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is linear in each of its arguments). But in separate evaluation, the function will
have a decreasing slope:
dWTP (τi)
dτi
= dE[U(τi)]
dτi
= E[β−1i ]−
σ−2i
s−2i + nσ−2i
E[β−1i ]
< E[β−1i ]
Thus the elasticity is less than one:
dWTP (τi)
dτi
τi
WTP (τi)
= dE[U(τi)]
dτi
τi
WTP (τi)
= dE[U(τi)]
dτi
E[β−1i ]
= 1− σ
−2
i
s−2i + nσ−2i
< 1
Second, we find that there is a contrast effect: an increase in the magnitude
of one member of the choice set (τ bi ) will decrease the WTP for all other members
of the choice set.
dWTP (τi)
dτ bi
= − σ
−2
i
s−2i + nσ−2i
E[β−1i ] < 0
5.2 Is the Inference Conscious?
The explanation for relative thinking just given treats it as optimal inference:
when there is an unobserved common factor, then the relative magnitude of an
object is a good proxy for its absolute value. This theory also fits the fact that
menu effects disappear in joint choice: because in joint choice both decisions
condition on the same information set.
There is a small literature on information-based explanations of violations of
revealed preference. Sen (1993) discusses examples where it is due to the “epis-
temic value of the menu”. Wernerfelt (1995) and Kamenica (2008) both give equi-
librium rationalisations of a decoy effect in the purchase of goods; where, for ex-
ample, you may rationally choose a large hat from the choice set {medium, large},
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but a medium hat from {small,medium, large}, because the composition of the
choice sets conveys payoff-relevant information that the firm knows themselves.
Prelec et al. (1997) show in experiments that inference can explain a large part of
certain previously observed decoy effects.
However, although inference from the choice set is surely important, relative
thinking appears to remain even when information effects are controlled for. First,
choice set effects occur even in choice among monetary gambles, where it would
be a stretch of the usual interpretation of choice to say that consumers infer
something about the value of money.25 Second, frames and irrelevant alternatives
continue to affect choice even when explicitly randomised. For example Ariely
et al. (2003) shows the anchoring effect works with digits from subjects’ social
security numbers, and Jahedi (2008) finds decoy effects with randomly generated
choice sets. Finally, contrast effects occur even when the order of alternatives is
random, as in Bhargava (2008).
Again there is an analogy with perception: optical illusions occur when people
apply a rational heuristic, but fail to integrate extra knowledge. In a contrast
illusion, contrast with the background is usually a good cue in judging the shade
of an object. However in a typical optical illusion the illumination is clearly
uniform over the whole area, so local contrast is not informative (because illumi-
nation does not vary at that level). Similarly, people may use a relative position
heuristic in choice, even when they are aware that an object’s relative position is
uninformative.
Overall this seems to closely fit the program of heuristics and biases outlined
by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), in which simple rules are used which perform
well in most typical contexts. Biases occur when they are applied outside that set
of contexts.
25See Birnbaum (1992), Herne (1999), and Stewart et al. (2003)
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6 Discussion
6.1 Related Literature
The literature on psychology of judgment has a number of strands which deal
with context effects on judgment and choice.
First, there is a large experimental literature documenting context influences
on judgment across different domains, for an overview see Poulton (1989).
Second there are a class of general theories trying to fit these patterns, the best
known is Parducci’s range-frequency theory (Parducci (1965),Parducci (1995))
which proposes that the set of stimuli can influence objective judgments of mag-
nitude and of preference. Parducci proposes that judgment of either magnitude
or value can be positively influenced by two factors: (1) its position in the range
presented (distance between the endpoints), and (2) its percentile rank in the
distribution of stimuli. Note that this gives the same predictions for compara-
tor effects as the model presented here, except for changes in the position of the
smallest comparator in the set.
Third, treatment of perception as an optimal inference problem is a quite
recent research area.26 For most of the 20th century research in perception tried
to relate behaviour to the structure of the nervous system. However since the mid
1990s a large empirical program has emerged modelling perceptual judgment as
optimal inference, see for example Kersten et al. (2004) and Purves et al. (2011).
An important related paper is Hsee and Zhang (2010), which proposes an infor-
mal theory of “evaluability”. They say that subjects are more sensitive to changes
in a certain dimension if (i) the evaluation mode is joint rather than separate;
(ii) they know more about the domain; and (iii) the dimension is intrinsically
evaluable. The model of relative thinking in this paper could be thought of as a
foundation for evaluability effects.
Also related is recent work on menu effects, where the weights put on different
dimensions depend on the choice set. An early attempt was Tversky and Simonson
(1993), more recent are Kőszegi and Rabin (2006), Bordalo (2011), and Koszegi
and Szeidl (2011).
26Though Helmholtz first stated the problem of perception as an inference problem in the
1860s.
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6.2 Reference Point and Position of the Origin
The predictions of the model presented in this paper are sensitive to the choice
of a reference point, and to the choice of dimensions of comparison. However the
sensitivity is not severe.
Choices are often described in terms of changes to your outcome relative to
your initial state, whereas in standard decision theory preferences are defined
over final outcomes, i.e. your initial state plus the change. This can create
an ambiguity in the model presented here if some alternatives contain negative
changes. For example when making a decision about a purchase we generally
describe alternatives with the price of each good, though we could equivalently
describe instead the terminal wealth (i.e., initial wealth minus price). This would
change the predictions of the model: for example increasing the price of some
alternative would, under the first description, lower sensitivity to prices; but in
the second description, because it would lower terminal wealth, it would lower
sensitivity to money. Note that this is only important for translations in the
reference point which change the sign of attributes; if the sign is preserved, then
likewise the sign of any comparative static prediction is preserved.
This is one reason why I have largely avoided discussing experiments relating to
probabilities, because a prospect of a gain with probability p can also be thought of
as a loss with probability 1− p, thus any change in the sensitivity to probability
will have different effects depending on how the gamble is thought of by the
subject. Nevertheless, the general patterns in choice between lotteries seem to
fit: experiments using matching and using choice with a common difference in
probability (i.e., Allais type questions) both seem to find diminishing sensitivity
in probability, as suggested by the model here (for data see, for example, (Bordalo
et al., 2010)).
A second limitation is that the predictions are sensitive to a choice of dimen-
sions. For example a point on a plane can be defined either using a Cartesian or a
polar coordinate system. Our definition of relative thinking preferences implicitly
assumes a canonical set of axes.
One final complication in interpretation is the behaviour of comparisons in
the extreme. This is a difficulty for almost all theories of comparison: it seems
sensible to assume that if a comparator becomes infinitely large or small, then it
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is ignored (e.g. increasing a comparison from $10 to $1 trillion might affect choice
less than increasing from $10 to $100). But then if lim
x→−∞f(x) = limx→+∞f(x), and
f ′(x) Ó= 0, then f must be non-monotonic. In other words, if the comparator effect
diminishes in the extremes, then it must be non-monotonic somewhere inside the
extremes. In fact the few experiments performed have found that even for quite
large magnitudes observed effects do not reverse, or only very slightly, see e.g.
Krishna et al. (2006) and Chapman and Johnson (1994).
7 Conclusion
This paper has tried to show the connection between two broad phenomena ob-
served in choice: First, choice behaviour in experiments often seems to show
rapidly diminishing sensitivity in many domains - in probability, time, money,
and in the quantity of a product. This phenomenon holds for both choice and
matching. Second, the value put on a good (both in choice and in matching) is
influenced by irrelevant comparisons, so that when a quantity comes to be rela-
tively small it is treated as absolutely small. I have tried to show that all these
phenomena fit a pattern of preferences being affected by the context, such that
higher comparators lower sensitivity.
I have also shown that anomalies often disappear in joint choice, which allows
us to define a utility function common to multiple choice sets, and thus observe
how choice sets affect preferences.
Finally I suggested an interpretation of the behaviour, as optimal for a common
set of situations, in which relative position is a good indicator for absolute value.
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8 Appendix - Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. In what follows I will use an abbreviated utility function,
dropping all the elements of the endowment {x1, ..., xn} which do not change, so
that
U(τi,−vj) ≡ U(xi + τi, xj − vj, x−i,j)
In this proof we wish to compare three utility functions: U , an initial utility
function, defined by some set of comparators; U i, one which differs only by having
one comparator along dimension i be greater; and U j, which differs from U only
in having one comparator along dimension j be greater. The matched values, vj,
vij, and v
j
j are defined by the following equations
U(0, 0) = U(τi,−vj)
U i(0, 0) = U i(τi,−vij)
U j(0, 0) = U j(τi,−vjj )
Using this notation the three conditions can thus be represented as
(i) MRSii,j < MRSi,j < MRS
j
i,j
(ii) vij < vj
(iii) vjj > vj
The last two conditions are in turn are equivalent to the following:
U i(0, 0) > U i(τi,−vj)
U j(0, 0) < U j(τi,−vj)
which say that the matched value vj, which was indifferent under the original
set of comparators, will become too high a price when a comparator increases on
the i dimension (under U i), and will become too low a price when a comparator
increases on the j dimension (under U j). This equivalence holds because the
utility functions are continuous and strictly increasing in dimension j.
I will first show that (i) implies (ii) and (iii). The difference in utility be-
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tween two points on a utility function can be expressed as the integral over the
marginal utility along any path between those points. One path is along the indif-
ference curve connecting the endowment point ({0, 0}) and the matched allocation
({τi,−vj}),
U(τi,−vj)− U(0, 0) =
ˆ τi
0
(
Ui(t,−v(t))− Uj(t,−v(t)) dv
dt
∣∣∣∣∣
dU=0
)
dt
Here Ui and Uj are partial derivatives, and v(t) is the matched value of t, defined
as above. We can thus express this in terms of the marginal rate of substitution
between i and j
MRSi,j =
Ui
Uj
= dv
dt
∣∣∣∣∣
dU=0
So
U(τi,−vj)− U(0, 0) =
ˆ τi
0
(Ui(t,−v(t))− Uj(t,−v(t))MRSi,j) dt
=
ˆ τi
0
Uj (MRSi,j −MRSi,j) dt
This last expression is zero, simply showing that the utility at the beginning and
the end of an indifference curve must be the same, because utility does not change
anywhere along that curve (i.e., the gradient theorem).
However, now consider evaluating the change in utility along exactly the same
path according to one of the other utility functions, U i or U j. We get these
expressions
U i(τi,−vj)− U i(0, 0) =
ˆ τi
0
U ij
(
MRSii,j −MRSi,j
)
dt
U j(τi,−vj)− U j(0, 0) =
ˆ τi
0
U jj
(
MRSji,j −MRSi,j
)
dt
The term in brackets is no longer zero. In fact, under condition (i), we know that
MRSii,j < MRSi,j < MRS
j
i,j. Thus we can conclude, as desired:
U i(τi,−vj) < U i(0, 0)
U j(τi,−vj) > U j(0, 0)
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Next we wish to show that (ii) and (iii) imply (i). Suppose a counterexample
existed, i.e. suppose that vij < vj always holds but there is some point {x1, ...xn}
with
MRSii,j ≥MRSi,j
Now consider an expression for a matched value, vj(τi):
U(xi, xj, x−i,j) = U(xi + τi, xj − vj(τi), x−i,j)
We can solve for the derivative (omitting the arguments for U and MRS)
0 = dτi
∂U
∂xi
− dvj ∂U
dxj
dvj
dτi
= −∂U/∂xi
∂U/∂xj
= −MRSi,j
Thus the matched value vj(τi) can be implicitly defined as,
vj(τi) =
ˆ τi
0
MRSi,j(xi + s, xj + v(τi − s), x−i,j)ds
Thus for a sufficiently small τi, vjj > vj if and only if MRS
j
i,j > MRSi,j.
Proof of Proposition 2. This follows fairly directly from the preceding proposition.
(Note: for compactness I represent the joint choice sets as superscripts, instead
of conditioning arguments). We know that MRS{A(λx)}x,p < MRS{A(x)}x,p , and by
applying the proposition WTP {A(λx)}(λx) < WTP {A(x)}(λx). But because each
utility function is linear, WTP {A(x)}(λx) = λWTP {A(x)}(x), so
WTP (λx|{A(λx)}) < λWTP (x|{A(x)})
as desired.
Proof of Proposition 3. To show that relative thinking entails a common differ-
ence effect, we use the three choice sets as defined in the proposition, which gives
us:
U(x11, x12|A′) = U(x21, x22|A′)
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U(x11, x12 + τ |A′) = U(x21, x22 + τ |A′)
U(x11, x12 + τ |A”) < U(x21, x22 + τ |A”)
Where the last step uses proposition 1: the change in MRS when shifting from
A′ to A” makes the relative advantage of alternative 1 along dimension 2 become
less significant.
Proof of Proposition 4. With monotonically unknown preferences
MRSi.j(x) =
∂U/∂xi
∂U/∂xj
= E [h(βi)] f
′(xi)
E [h(βj)] f ′(xj)
Because Gi satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property, the expected value of
h(βi) is decreasing in Ri (Milgrom (1981)), thus, as desired,
∂MRSi,j(x)
∂Ri
< 0
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Part III
Relative Thinking and Markups
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Relative Thinking and Markups∗
September 30, 2011
Abstract
In experiments subjects regularly trade off time and money at inconsis-
tent rates, apparently becoming less sensitive to money when considering
the purchase of a more-expensive item. In this paper I introduce a de-
mand function that matches this behaviour, and derive the predictions for
equilibrium market structure, and then finally discuss market evidence.
The demand function is derived from a utility function which has context-
dependent sensitivity to different goods (e.g., time, money). In market
equilibrium with unit total demand the model predicts three phenomena:
higher cost goods tend to have higher markups; higher cost goods tend to
have greater price dispersion; and higher cost goods will have a larger num-
ber of sellers. The first two facts are commonly observed in the empirical
IO literature. Finally I introduce a novel dataset of 3,500 markups from a
branch of a chain drugstore, with cross-section evidence in support of the
theory.
1 Introduction
In the study of industrial organisation, assumptions about utility can put im-
portant restrictions on demand functions. Assuming a utility function means
assuming that consumers trade off different goods at consistent rates.
∗I would like to thank Ruchir Agarwal, Francesco Caselli, Erik Eyster, David Laibson, Ariel
Pakes, Matthew Rabin, Andrei Shleifer, Tomasz Strzalecki, Glen Weyl and seminar participants
at Harvard for extremely helpful comments.
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However a famous laboratory experiment seems to show that rates of trade-off
between time and money can vary drastically between situations. Tversky and
Kahneman (1981) found that most of their experimental subjects were willing to
drive 20 minutes to save $5 from a $15 item, but not to drive 20 minutes to save $5
from a $125 item. If the subjects had utility linear in money, then their willingness
to drive should be the same in both situations. If instead they had concave utility
of money, the preference reversal should go in the opposite direction.
If people are subject to this bias in the real world, i.e. valuing money less when
considering larger values, this will have important effects on demand functions,
and therefore important effects on the equilibrium distribution of prices and quan-
tities. In this paper I show how this relative thinking will affect demand under
fairly general assumptions, deriving three predictions about equilibrium. First,
margins will be increasing in cost (equivalently, pass-through will be greater than
1, or demand will be cost-amplifying1). Second, price dispersion will be increasing
in cost. This holds whether dispersion is measured as the range or standard devia-
tion of prices. Third, entry will be increasing in cost. Each follows simply because
higher costs, insofar as they lead to higher prices, lower customers’ sensitivity to
marginal units of money, having an effect on prices equivalent to an increase in
transport costs (more generally, an increase in any costs of substitution between
goods).
Much empirical literature supports these predictions. For the markup pre-
dictions, most time series studies find pass-through rates greater than 1. For
the dispersion predictions we only have cross section studies, though again these
strongly support the predictions. I discuss in detail other explanations for these
patterns.
In this paper I also introduce a novel dataset of 3,500 costs and prices from a
branch of a chain drugstore. The dataset is unusual in having cost and price, and
therefore markups. The dataset shows an extremely close relationship between
cost and markup (here defined as price minus cost). One striking feature is how
few outliers there are. For example, there are around 400 products with a cost (to
the retailer) of more than ten dollars, and around 400 with a cost of less than one
dollar. Seventy percent of the former have a markup of more than $5. Yet, of the
1Weyl and Fabinger (2009)
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latter, not a single product has a markup of more than $5. Aside from relative
thinking, differences in markups can be caused by many factors: elasticity of
demand, customer demographics, frequency of purchase. But it is remarkable that
there should not be a single $1 item with the right mix of elasticity, demographics,
and purchase frequency to justify a $5 markup.
2 Relative Thinking
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) introduced relative thinking into the literature
on biases in economic decision-making with this pair of questions, given to two
different groups of subjects:
(A) Imagine that you are about to purchase a jacket for $125, and
a calculator for $15. The calculator salesman informs you that the
calculator you wish to buy is on sale for $10 at the other branch of
the store, located 20 minutes drive away. Would you make the trip to
the other store?
(B) Imagine that you are about to purchase a jacket for $15, and
a calculator for $125. The calculator salesman informs you that the
calculator you wish to buy is on sale for $120 at the other branch of
the store, located 20 minutes drive away. Would you make the trip to
the other store?
Someone who makes consistent trade-offs between time and money should answer
the same way to both questions. However Tversky and Kahnemann found that
in case A, when the $5 discount is off a $15 total, then 68% of subjects said they
will make the trip to the other store. In case B, when the $5 discount is off a $125
total, only 29% of subjects were willing to make the trip.
The effect has been replicated in many variations, though mostly in hypo-
thetical experiments. As an illustration of the magnitude of these hypothetical
responses, subjects in Azar (2011) were asked how large a saving would justify
a 20 minute trip to another store. When contemplating buying a $10 pen, the
median response was a $4 saving. When contemplating a $1000 computer, the
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median response was a $50 saving. When contemplating a $10,000 car, the median
response was a $300 saving.2
There is not an agreement in the literature on how to describe the source of
this inconsistency. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) say it comes from diminishing
sensitivity and narrow bracketing. Azar (2008) says that higher prices tend to
lower psychic transport costs. In a companion paper (Cunningham (2011)), I give
an alternative explanation: tradeoff decisions are influenced by the choice set,
such that observing higher magnitudes along any dimension will tend to lower
sensitivity to that dimension. Thus higher prices cause lower sensitivity to money,
leading to demand which is less sensitive for high prices than for low prices, thus
higher markups for high cost goods.
3 Modeling Relative Thinking
I here introduce a model of decision-making where the utility function depends
on the choice set in a particular way. The model is discussed in greater detail in
Cunningham (2011).
Intuitively, the model states that subjects become less sensitive to a marginal
difference when they are confronted with larger magnitudes of that good. Thus
when they are considering large amounts of money, a small difference comes to
seem less important. So for more expensive goods, consumers are less likely to
take a trip to save some money.3
Let subjects choose from a choice set A containingm alternatives {x1, .., xm} =
A, where each alternative is a vector of n attributes xi = {xi1, .., xin} ∈ Rn. An
ordinary utility function is just a function of the attributes of each alternative
U(x1, .., xn), whereas we here instead consider a choice-set dependent utility func-
2The effect is so strong, it seems to sometimes affect economists writing on markups. For
example Lach (2002) explains some data as consistent with rationality because “search costs are
low relative to the high price of the good and, as a consequence, more searching for the lowest
price is undertaken.”
3Incidentally this also predicts an effect of price on add-on purchases, as Savage (1954) puts
it: “a man buying a car for $2,134.56 is tempted to order it with a radio installed, which will
bring the total price to $2,228.41, feeling that the difference is trifling. But, when he reflects
that, if he already had the car, he certainly would not spend $93.85 for a radio for it, he realizes
that he made an error.”
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tion U(x1, .., xn|A).
Definition 1. A choice-set dependent utility function U(x|A) exhibits relative
thinking if, for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and alternative 0 ≤ k ≤ m,
∂
∂xki
MRSi,j ≡ ∂
∂xki
∂U/∂xi
∂U/∂xj
≤ 0
The formula expresses that an increase in the magnitude of any of the alterna-
tives’ attributes along dimension i will cause the relative sensitivity to everywhere
decrease, i.e. the marginal rate of substitution will get smaller. Figure 1 shows
that, whenB shifts out along the horizontal dimension, this causes marginal utility
with respect to that dimension to decrease, and therefore causes the MRS to fall,
i.e. the indifference curves to flatten (in each case, we plot only the indifference
curve which passes through alternative A).
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Figure 1: The Effect of Changes in the Choice Set on Indifference Curves
4 Relative Thinking in Market Equilibrium
I begin with a baseline model to show how there will be perfect pass-through
of costs in a model of differentiation under two conditions used in the standard
Hotelling model: (i) unit demand (meaning that every consumer buys exactly one
product, i.e. total demand is inelastic); and (ii) money is linearly separable in the
utility function, i.e. there are no income effects.
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Suppose there are N firms, and a unit mass of consumers, indexed with j.
Each consumer chooses to purchase one firm’s product, from the vector of prices
p = (p1, ..., pN) ∈ RN , and each consumers has a vector of idiosyncratic valuations
v = (v1, ..., vN) ∈ RN . Valuations are drawn from the continuously differentiable
joint distribution F .
I assume quasilinear utility, i.e. the utility that consumer j receives from
purchasing product i is assumed to be:4
Uj,i = vj,i + β(mj − pi)
where mj is the consumer’s wealth, and vj,i is consumer j’s idiosyncratic value for
good i. For now I consider β to be a constant; in the next section I will allow β
to depend on the prices observed.5
Each consumer will thus choose the i which maximises the term vj,i − βpi.
I assume that in equilibrium the maximum value of vj,i − βpi is always greater
than an outside option u = 0; this assumption makes total demand inelastic - i.e.,
every customer buys exactly one good.
Demand can be written as an integral over the density of preferences:
Di(p) =
∞ˆ
βpi
ˆ
∏
j Ó=i Sj,i
f(v)dv−idvi
Where Sj,i = (−∞, βpj + vi− βpi), which represents the set of valuations of good
j such that, at given prices, good i will be preferred to good j. By our assumption
of unit demand, vj,i > βpi, so we can simplify this to
Di(p) =
∞ˆ
−∞
ˆ
∏
j Ó=i Sj,i
f(v)dv−idvi
This says that the total density inside the intersection of Sj,i for all j Ó= i is
equal to the demand for good i. Note that this demand function is invariant to
4This is an indirect utility function, equivalent to a utility function which is linear in con-
sumption of the outside good.
5The assumption that consumers share a common β is without loss of generality, because of
the lack of restriction on the distribution of v.
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a constant addition to all prices, i.e. it is preserved when prices are transformed
pi = pi+τ .6 In words, consumers’ decisions are determined only by the differences
between prices.
Turn now to the producers. Each producer faces the same marginal cost, c,
and all choose their price simultaneously, prior to consumers’ demand decisions.
They thus have a profit function
pii = (pi − c)Di(p)
With first-order condition,
β(pi − c)Dii(p) +Di(p) = 0
where Dii = ∂
∂pi
Di(p).
The model so far allows great flexibility in the demand system, and does
not guarantee either existence or uniqueness of an equilibrium set of prices. For
simplicity we therefore assume that demand is twice differentiable, and the Jaco-
bian of the demand system is negative definite, which guarantees existence and
uniqueness (Vives (2001), p145).7 The model thus encompasses both horizontal
and vertical differentiation.8
This allows our first comparative static,
Proposition 1. Without relative thinking dpi
dc
= 1 for all i.
This simply states that, because demand depends only on differences between
prices, the equilibrium in relative prices will be independent of the level of cost,
in other words aggregate pass-through will be exactly 1.
6This depends of course on u being sufficiently low.
7I will assume this holds both for the ordinary demand function and the demand function
with relative thinking. Caplin and Nalebuff (1991)have an extended discussion of conditions on
utility functions which will underly a demand system with an equilibrium.
8Typically in vertical differentiation models, consumers have the same preferred ranking
among alternatives; in horizontal differentiation, they have different rankings. Because we put
so few constraints on F , either can occur in this model. In a two-firm Hotelling model with
uniform customers and quadratic transport costs (Tirole (1994) p281), the difference in utilities
uj,1 − uj,2 would be distributed uniformly.
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4.1 Relative Thinking
I now introduce a utility function with choice-set dependence. In particular, it
is quasilinear in money for a given choice set, but sensitivity to money decreases
with the magnitude of elements in the choice set.9
Uj,i = vj,i + β(p1, ..., pN) [mj − pi]
with
β > 0, ∂β(p1, ..., pN)
∂pk
< 0, ∀k
The marginal rate of substitution between goods and money is now
MRSv,p =
∂U/∂p
∂U/∂v
= −β(p1, ..., pN)
Thus, because β is decreasing in every price, the utility function exhibits relative
thinking, as earlier defined.
For now I will assume that firms do not internalise their own effect on β; re-
laxing this assumption is discussed later. Though β may vary between customers,
our results here do depend on ∂β
∂pi
being the same for all customers. Similar re-
sults could be derived if we allowed ∂β
∂pi
to vary between customers, but we would
require restrictions on the distribution of v, and its covariance with ∂β
∂pi
.
Using this representation, pass-through will be greater than one, i.e., higher
cost goods will have higher markups:
Proposition 2. With relative thinking then dpi
dc
≥ 1, for all i, i.e. aggregate
pass-through is greater than one.
This holds simply because when prices are higher, customers become less sen-
sitive to price differences (in the Hotelling model, it is equivalent to an increase in
transport costs). For every firm, the sensitivity of demand to price becomes less,
so they raise their price.
9See Cunningham (2011) for an explanation of how joint choice experiments can identify
choice-set effects. In this case quasilinear preferences can be identified if subjects, when presented
with two choice sets jointly, make no preference reversals when one choice set differs from the
other only in a common difference in prices.
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Proposition 3. With relative thinking then for any i and j, |dpi−dpj |
dc
≥ 0, i.e.
dispersion is increasing in cost.
The result may be thought to be surprisingly unambiguous, given the lack of
assumptions on demand. Mathematically it holds because demand depends only
on weighted price differences β(pj − pi), and on nothing else. Thus, if all prices
increase by the same amount, the first-order conditions will still hold. Likewise if
β increases by some factor λ, and all price differences decrease by the same factor
(equivalently, if all margins decrease by this factor) then the terms β(pj − pi) will
remain unchanged, and the first-order conditions will hold.
Intuitively, when consumers become 10% less sensitive to prices (β falls by
10%), then having all firms increase their margins by 10% will return demand and
marginal demand to exactly the same position as before, restoring equilibrium.
4.2 Endogenous Entry
So far I have assumed a fixed number of firms, implying that the profit earned will
vary with cost (because cost increases markups, without affecting quantity sold).
Free entry will naturally eliminate the effect of cost on profits. Nevertheless the
effect on markups remains, at least in the simplified case of symmetric competition
on a circle (a Salop model).
For simplicitly I assume a large market and thus treat the number of firms n
as a continuous variable.
Proposition 4. When customers are distributed uniformly on a circle, with quadratic
transport costs, and the number of firms n is determined by a fixed cost C and a
zero profit condition, then
dn
dc
> 0
dp
dc
> 1
The lower sensitivity to price is now taken up in two ways: firms charge higher
markups, and more firms enter.
Thus for high-priced goods which are sold at multiple outlets, we should see
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many retailers, each selling relatively few goods. This may be true in some mar-
kets, e.g. jewellers, car dealers, estate agents, optometrists, where it could be
thought that there are a surprising number of low-volume, high-margin outlets.
As with most cross-industry predictions, this is an extremely difficult proposition
to test, because many other characteristics important for industry structure are
likely to covary with the cost of the good being sold (Sutton (1992)).
5 Robustness
5.1 Endogenising β
The model presented does not allow firms to take into account the effect of their
own price on sensitivity, β. I will discuss briefly the consequences of this in a
2-firm model.
Call the two firms H and L, with names assigned such that pH ≥ pL. Let the
proportion of customers who buy good L be given by F (β(pH − pL)). The two
profit functions and first-order conditions will be
piL = (pL − c)F (β(pH − pL))
piH = (pH − c) [1− F (β(pH − pL))]
pi′L = F − (pL − c)βF ′ +
∂β
∂pL
(pH − pL)(pL − c)F
pi′H = 1− F − (pH − c)βF ′ −
∂β
∂pH
(pH − pL)(pH − c)F ′
Only the final term in each first-order condition is new. Because ∂β
∂pL
< 0 ,
the extra term must be negative for firm L, indicating an incentive to lower their
price. A lower price makes every consumer more sensitive to a given difference in
prices, and the marginal consumer therefore switches to the low-price firm. The
corresponding term is positive for firm H because they are better off when the
marginal consumer becomes less sensitive to a given difference in prices. In a
symmetric equilibrium where pH = pL the term disappears because neither firm
cares about their influence on β; a change in β will not affect the choice of any
customer.
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In this case endogenising β gives an extra incentive towards price dispersion.
This is of relevance if β(p¯) is decreasing and convex, because as c rises, and prices
rise, then β′ will become smaller, lowering the incentives for dispersion. The net
effect may then go in the opposite direction from Proposition 3. It remains to be
shown under what conditions the direct effect dominates this indirect effect.
5.2 Income Effects
I have assumed that the underlying utility function is linearly separable in money,
i.e. the consumer is risk neutral. Introducing concave utility for money is not
trivial, but it is likely to reinforce the results. As prices increase, terminal wealth
decreases, so the marginal utility of money increases. The effect thus is similar to
an increase in β, raising the sensitivity to differences in price, and thus lowering
equilibrium markups and equilibrium dispersion - i.e. the effect is in the opposite
direction from that predicted by relative thinking. Put another way, risk aversion
does not seem to help explain the observed positive relationship between price
and markup, if anything it seems to predict the opposite.
6 Notes on Interpretation
The predictions from relative thinking hinge on the contents of the choice set, and
in many situations this may be unobservable.
This is a common problem with behavioural theories. Typical choice functions
in economics depend only on objective outcomes, e.g. streams of consumption.
It is often argued that choice also depends on subjective factors such as the level
of consumption relative to a reference point; the source of income; the framing
of a decision. These subjective variables are typically not observed in economic
situations of interest, for example when predicting consumption from a tax rebate,
the effect of a subsidy, or the decision to enroll in college, the subjective elements
of the decision are not observed, so these theories are difficult to test.10
10Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) show how the reference point can be endogenised, i.e. made a
subject of the choice set, in a reference-dependent theory.
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In the theory presented here, the composition of the choice set is an unobserv-
able subjective parameter.
In the most general sense, a person’s choice set at each point is the set of the
possible stochastic streams of consumption for the rest of their life. In this case,
an increase in the price of a calculator should equally affect all their tradeoffs
involving money, not just their choice of where to buy a calculator. So when this
theory specifies a choice set, A, this should be thought of as a consideration set,
meaning a set of salient alternatives at a given moment.11
I conjecture two common sets of salient alternatives. First, the same item,
offered at different prices at different stores. This has been the principal focus of
the paper.
An alternative choice set could be choosing between different varieties within
a product category, side by side on a shelf. The analysis of pricing with multiple
products is complicated, but in general relative thinking should introduce an
incentive to raise prices, thus lowering β, and increasing demand at every price. If
we allow the firm to introduce new products, this may also explain the decoy effect
(sometimes called “compromise effect”), where introducing a high-price product
shifts demand from low-price to medium-price options (Tversky and Simonson
(1993), Krishna et al. (2006)).
7 Evidence
Here I survey the evidence for the first two predictions: that markup is increasing
in cost, and that dispersion is increasing in cost.
To summarise, there is strong evidence for both effects in the cross section of
products. However in cross-section studies identification is not strong, I discuss
a variety of possible confounding factors. In time series studies identification is
much stronger, and published studies largely supports the model’s predictions for
markup. Unfortunately I am not aware of any time-series studies which look at
price dispersion.
11The problem of too-large choice sets aﬄicts virtually any theory of menu-dependent pref-
erences. There is some discussion of the difference between a choice set and a consideration set
in Koszegi and Szeidl (2011).
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The paper’s predictions for prices are driven through relative thinking’s distor-
tions of the set of demand functions. We are thus indirectly looking for features
of demand by observing prices. There are then two factors we should consider
in interpreting the evidence: first, whether the inferred shape of demand could
occur without relative thinking. Second, whether observed prices may not reveal
demand, due to other confounding factors.
Tackling the first problem, the prediction can be stated as pass-through rates
being greater than one. Pass-through rates depend on the industry structure. If
the industry is perfectly competitive then the rate of pass through must be less
than or equal to 1 (as long as demand slopes down and supply slopes up). At the
other extreme, for a monopolist, their pass-through rate depends on the curvature
of the demand curve they face: it will be greater than 1 if and only if the demand
curve is log convex.12
Of more interest is the oligopoly case, because all the studies we cite consider
homogenous goods sold at different outlets. As we have shown in the previous
sections, with unit demand and quasilinear preferences, then pass-through will
always be equal to 1. Any deviation must therefore be due to a violation of unit
demand, i.e. total demand varying with cost.13 In a symmetric model this must
mean that as prices rise all firms face a lower ratio of marginal consumers than
inframarginal, i.e. demand has a decreasing hazard rate (a.k.a. a heavy-tailed
distribution). I cannot rule this out as an alternative explanation of the results.
Turning to price dispersion, most models predict that dispersion is independent
of cost, because most assume unit demand and quasilinear preferences: i.e., they
set up the problem as choosing which store to buy an item from, ignoring the
question of how many items to buy. The problem is thus entirely independent of
cost, and this holds for dispersion driven by differentiation (as in this paper), or
dispersion driven by imperfect information (see Baye et al. (2006) for a survey).
It is not clear what can be said about cost and dispersion when the assumption
of unit demand is relaxed.
12The monopolist’s first order condition is (p − c) = −Q(p)/Q′(p), so dpdc = 11+ ∂∂p Q(p)Q′(p) , and
∂2
∂2p log(Q(p)) =
∂
∂p
Q′(p)
Q(p) , thus log convexity or concavity determines the pass-through rate.
13We discussed earlier why violations of quasi-linearity are likely to push in the other direction.
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7.1 Evidence on Markups
Because cost data is difficult to obtain (and because of endogeneity problems)
estimates of pass-through have often been based on tax changes, which largely find
pass-through rates greater than one. For cigarette taxes Barzel (1976) found pass-
through slightly greater than one. For alcohol taxes Kenkel (2005) and Young and
Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) both find pass-through greater than one. Estimating
pass-through using changes in broad-based sales taxes, Poterba (1996) finds pass-
through close to 1, but Besley and Rosen (1999) find a higher pass-through.
I have collected a new dataset, which documents the cross-section relationship
of cost and markup. The data are 3,500 observations of cost and price from a
Cambridge, Massachusetts branch of a national drugstore chain. It is unusual to
observe cost for a retailer: a comparable dataset is used in Eichenbaum et al.
(2011), who say “we’re really, I think, one of the first people to ever get data on
marginal costs and you see fascinating patterns” (Eichenbaum and Vaitilingam
(2009)). However Eichenbaum et al. are not able to analyse data on markups,
as I am, because they say “[o]ur agreement with the retailer does not permit us
to report information about the level of the markup for any one item or group of
items.”
Our dataset is documented further in an appendix. Figure 2 plots item cost
against item markup, and shows the very strong relationship between the two
variables. A $1.00 increase in cost is associated with an increase in absolute
markup of $0.73, thus proportional markup is decreasing in cost, although slowly.
One feature in particular is notable: the absence of outliers, i.e. goods with ei-
ther low-cost and high-markup, or high-cost and low-markup. If the cost-markup
relationship was driven by a correlation between cost and demographics, the cor-
relation must be extremely strong. Put another way, the graph would imply that
there are no low-cost goods with high-demographic customers, or high-cost goods
with low-demographic customers. As examples, various types of branded lip balm,
coffee filters, and scented candles (plausibly high-demographic goods) all have cost
below $1 and markup below $1. Whereas only two products with cost above $10
has a markup below $1.14
14Huggies nappies and Pampers nappies.
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Because this is cross-section evidence, the cost-markup relationship does not
directly identify the shape of the demand functions: it could be driven by con-
founding factors. Three factors are worth discussing: the demographics of the
customers, the substitutability with other goods sold by the firm, and the fre-
quency of purchase. All three factors are reasons why demand might be less sen-
sitive for high cost items, so they could predict both the markup and dispersion
relationships.
First, if high-cost goods were bought by customers with less sensitive demand
(lower hazard rates), this would cause them to be associated with a higher markup.
An important determinant of demand sensitivity should be income, determining
the opportunity cost of your time, thus if high-cost items are bought by high-
income customers, we expect the positive predicted relationship.
Second, if firms sell multiple products then the optimal markup depends on
interactions: if high-cost goods tend to be substitutes, and low-cost goods tend
to be complements, this would again predict the observed relationship. A strong
source of complementarity would come from any fixed cost of a visit to a store; in
effect, if a good is often purchased in a basket with other goods, the total markup
can be spread out over the total basket. Thus if low-cost goods are more often
bought in a basket with other goods, this will also generate a positive cost-markup
relationship in the cross-section.
Third, if a good is more frequently purchased, there is a stronger incentive to
collect price information, leading to a higher price sensitivity (Sorensen (2000)).
If high-cost goods tend to be purchased less frequently, high cost goods should
thus have higher markups, and higher price dispersion.
Finally, there are some biases which may affect estimation. First, the observed
marginal cost of goods does not account for other variable costs, such as handling.
If high cost goods tend to have higher handling costs, this would also account for
highermeasured margins, even when the true margins are the same. (One handling
cost which is certainly higher for high-cost goods is simply the cost of capital).
Second, there may be some goods which have high cost, and their optimal margin
would be low, but which are not sold. For example, if they are sold infrequently,
the opportunity cost of allocating shelf-space to this good may be too high. Thus
if there is a negative correlation between cost and turnover, we should expect to
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observe positive correlation between cost and markup in products observed due to
censoring. Third, firms may simply use a rule of thumb in pricing, marking up by a
constant fraction, even when it departs from the profit maximising price. Looking
again at figure 2, if firms used a rule of thumb we would expect observations to be
lined up along upward sloping lines. Instead we see much variation for products
with the same cost, indicating that the firm conditions on information other than
cost when setting price.
7.2 Evidence on Dispersion
There are a number of empirical papers which document the correlates of price
dispersion. Most papers do not have access to cost data, but they do report the
relationship between price and dispersion. Unfortunately I do not know of any
papers about dispersion which use a strongly exogenous source of cost variation,
as in the literature above which measures the effect of tax changes on markups.
Instead all the papers we describe here are in the cross section, and so are subject
to the caveats that we have already mentioned.
In short, every study I know of has found a very strong positive relationship
between price and price dispersion. The effect is so strong that a number of papers
use proportional dispersion as a measure, i.e. using p1−p21
2 (p1+p2)
instead of (p1 − p2).
If proportional price dispersion is constant in cost, then absolute dispersion is
increasing in cost. However to be consistent with the models they cite, these
papers should be measuring absolute price dispersion (see, for example, Baye
et al. (2004), Clay et al. (2002), Jaeger and Storchmann (2011), Lach (2002)).
Confusion on this point leads to some illogical statements.15
An early paper on price dispersion was Pratt et al. (1979), using a variety of
different goods, and they find a strong positive relationship between price and dis-
persion. So do Aalto-Setala (2003) for groceries, Baye et al. (2004) and Pan et al.
(2001) for goods sold online, Clay et al. (2002) for books sold online, Hoomis-
sen (1988) and Lach (2002) for consumer goods, Jaeger and Storchmann (2011)
15For example, Clay et al. (2002) say “The increase in standard deviation with price is ...
somewhat surprising ... given that search models predict that customers will engage in more
search for higher priced items and so price dispersion will be lower.” Lach (2002) says “search
costs are low relative to the high price of the good and, as a consequence, more searching for
the lowest price is undertaken.”
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for wine, and Sorensen (2000) for prescription drugs. The empirical literature is
surveyed in Ratchford (2009).
The same caveats apply from last section, regarding correlates of cost. However
the two studies which control for purchase frequency finds that it makes very little
change to the estimated relationship between dispersion and price. In Pratt et al.
(1979), the estimated coefficient of ln(price) on s.d.(price) shrank from 0.892 to
0.836, when a crude control for purchase frequency was introduced. Sorensen
(2000) reports results using both cost and purchase frequency as explanatory
variables, and finds that a $1 higher cost is associated with a 20 cent increase in
the range of prices.
8 Related Literature
This paper broadly belongs to a family of recent literature examining the effects
of non-standard decision making in different market equilibrium settings, sureyed
in Ellison (2006) and Spiegler (2011).
The idea that proportional thinking may help explain patterns in price dis-
persion has been brought up a number of times, first by Tversky and Kahneman
(1981), in the course of introducing the jacket/calculator example, who mention
that it may explain the relationship between price and price dispersion found in
Pratt et al. (1979). Grewal and Marmorstein (1994) make the same claim, and
report that willingness to search seems related to the base price of a good, and
that dispersion seems to be increasing the price of goods.
Most closely related to this paper is Azar (2008), which constructs a 2-firm
model with horizontal differentiation. Azar shows that in that model dispersion is
increasing in transport costs, and proposes that relative thinking can be modelled
as transport costs increasing in price.16
This extends Azar’s work in a number of ways: in deriving the behavioural
16Using this interpretation, Azar (2008) says that higher prices can have negative welfare
effects through raising the unpleasantness of travel. It seems more natural to assume, as in
this paper, that relative thinking works through higher prices lowering the subjective value of
money, rather than raising the subjective value of transport. The distinction is useful for welfare
analysis, but also if we are to predict how tradeoffs are made against other goods apart from
time or money.
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results from a general model of relative thinking, in using a much more general
model, in deriving predictions for both the level and dispersion of prices, as well
as firm entry, and finally in introducing new data on the level of markups.
9 Conclusion
This paper has shown how relative thinking will change a system of demand func-
tions, which would ordinarily imply constant markups, such that in equilibrium
higher cost will be associated with higher markups, higher dispersion, and more
entry. We have shown that data supports the predictions, both in time series
and in cross-section, though other explanations are also consistent with the data.
Finally we introduced a large dataset of costs and prices from a drugstore, which
shows a very tight relationship between cost and price.
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Appendix 1: Description of Drugstore Data
The data is from a Cambridge, Massachusetts branch of a large national chain of
drugstores. The store has floorspace of approximately 500 square meters (5400
square feet). Another drugstore of a similar size, belonging to a competing chain,
is located directly across the road.
The store sells a variety of products, principally snacks, groceries, beauty
products, stationary, and drugs (both over-the-counter and prescription drugs,
however I was not able to observe the labels for the latter). The data was collected
by individually photographing price labels for 3,582 different products over a
period of 5 days (28 March - 3 April, 2011), from an estimated 6,000 products
in the entire store. From each photo I transcribed the product’s ID number, cost
code, and price. The ID numbers were matched against a list of ID numbers
downloaded from the chain’s website on April 4th 2011, which contained much
comprehensive information about each product. However 25% of the products
photographed were not listed on the website.
The cost (i.e., cost to the retailer) was inferred from the cost code, a sequence
of letters on the label. Originally I found the cipher used to decode it posted in
an online forum. Subsequently I have talked to staff at the store, one of whom
confirmed that the code represents cost. One of the interesting finally, the patterns
of cost are consistent with plausible changes in product composition. For example,
all half gallons of milk sell for $2.29, however the cost is increasing in fat content,
the costs for 0%, 1%, 2%, and full fat milk are $1.66, $1.72, $1.76 and $1.78
respectively.
Some products were marked both with a regular price and a temporary sale
price. For these I recorded only the regular price. If a promotion was subsidised
by the manufacturer without updating the cost (in my observation, cost codes
were not updated when switching to and from a promotion), then this would lead
to incorrect measurement of margins. Note that in the US the FTC regulates
former price comparisons, requiring that the former price be one at which “the
article was offered to the public on a regular basis for a reasonably substantial
period of time.”17
17See http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/guides/decptprc.htm
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I have asked two employees about the cost code. One was not aware of its
meaning. The other knew the code. She said that they use it for making decisions
about items to promote, especially when they have a lot of leftover stock. She
also said that it was not used much, because most pricing decisions are made at
the firm’s headquarters.
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Appendix 2: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Corresponding to each first-order condition, there is a to-
tal derivative (suppressing the arguments to D):
(dpi − dc)β[Dii] + β2(pi − c)
m∑
j=1
dpjDiij − dp1β2(pi − c)
m∑
j=1
Dii1
+β
m∑
j=1
dpjDij − dp1β
m∑
j=1
Dij = 0
Where we define Diij = ∂∂xjDii. Dividing by dc and rearranging:
(dpi
dc
− 1)β[Dii] + β2(pi − c)
m∑
j=1
[dpj
dc
− dp1
dc
]Diij + β
m∑
j=1
[dpj − dp1]Dij = 0
It can be seen that this equation is solved exactly when dp1
dc
= dp2
dc
= ... =
dpm
dc
= 1. Because we are assuming a unique solution to the first-order conditions,
this must be the only solution to the set of total-derivative equations.
Proof of Proposition 2. The first order condition remains
β(pi − c)Dii(p) +Di(p) = 0
where demand is
Di(p) =
∞ˆ
−∞
ˆ
∏
j Ó=i Sj,i
f(v)dv−idvi
Sj,i = (−∞, βpj + vi − βpi)
This can be written in terms of β times the margin of each firm, β(pi − c):
Sj,i = (−∞, vi + β(pj − c)− β(pi − c))
Thus the first-order conditions will all be satisfied if d[β(pi − c)] = 0, for all i.
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Thus, letting β = β(p1, .., pn), and βj = ∂β(p1,...,pn)∂pj ,
d[β(p1, ..., pn)(pi − c)] = (pi − c)
m∑
j=1
dpjβj + β(dpi − dc) = 0
dpi − dc
pi − c = −
1
β
m∑
j=1
βjdpj
This quantity cannot be negative.18 This shows that the proportional change
in margins is equal for every firm. This also can be written as:
dpi
dc
= 1− (pi − c)
β(p¯)
m∑
j=1
βj(p¯)dpj
Because βj < 0 for all j, and markups are always non-negative, this proves
the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. If pi > pj, then
|dpi − dpj|
dc
= dpi
dc
− dpj
dc
= −(pi − pj)
β
m∑
k=1
βjdpk
which is greater than zero, because β′ < 0. The argument is analogous for
pj > pi.
Proof of Proposition 4. We assume a continuum of firms, so that we can stipulate
a zero profit condition which holds with equality: profits must equal the fixed cost
C. In a symmetric equilibrium the two conditions will be:
(p− c)F = C
(p− c)βf = F
When F is uniform, then the conditions become
(p− c) 1
n
= C
18Suppose dpi/dc < 0, then dpi/dc−1p−c <
dpi/dc
p < 0, so the effect on β is larger than the effect
on p, which we ruled out.
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(p− c)β = 1
n
Solving these two conditions we get
n = (βC)−1/2
p− c = C1/2β−1/2
Then we get:
dp− dc = −dp
[
1
2
∂β
∂p
C
1
2β−
3
2
]
dp
dc
−1 = −dp
dc
β′C1/2β−3/2
2
dp
dc
= 1
1 + β′C1/2β−3/22
> 1
and
dn
dc
= −12
(
C
β
)−1/2
dβ
dc
> 0
Because dβ
dc
= ∂β
∂p
dp
dc
< 0.
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Figure 2: Cost and Markup in 3,500 Items from a Drugstore.
Both axes are plotted on a base-10 log scale; each of the three upward-sloping lines
thus represent constant proportional markup rates of 10%, 100%, and 1000%. The
curved pattens in the data points are caused by clustering of prices at common
price-points: 99 cents, $1.99, etc.
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Figure 3: Average Proportional Markup (p−c
p
) by Product Category
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